Reason and Instinct. 5463 



was inadequate to — rescue that master from the imminent danger. At 

 least it is thus we should have reasoned had it been a dumb human 

 being who had acted as these dogs are declared to have done, and we 

 should, moreover, have given him credit for the thoughtfulness and 

 energy he displayed, in spite of the great natural disadvantages he lay 

 under, for giving alarm or soliciting assistance in the alleged case of 

 need. Will it not then be uncandid and unfair if we reason and deal 

 on other grounds with the dumb brute ? 



Once more: a terrier acquires "a habit of hunting for hares by 

 himself. He soon found that he was labouring in vain, for, with all 

 his hard running, he never could catch one. His master often watched 

 his endeavours to coax an excellent greyhound out of the yard. He 

 at last effected his purpose. The good nose of the terrier soon enabled 

 him to find a hare, which the greyhound killed and brought home. 

 After that the two dogs became the most arrant poachers in the 

 country, and were inseparable till the halter ended their poaching, 

 their friendship and their lives." ( c Gleanings,' i. 25.) A somewhat 

 similar case occurs to my recollection, except that a setter and a grey- 

 hound were the parties implicated. To prevent the setter from hunting 

 on his own account, a heavy clog was fastened to his neck. The 

 difficulty, however, hence arising, was surmounted by the greyhound 

 carrying the clog in his mouth until the setter found the game ; he 

 then dropped it and began the course. Again ; " A raven frequently 

 went hunting with a dog that had been bred up with him. On their 

 arrival at a covert the dog entered and drove the hares and rabbits 

 from the thicket, while the raven, posted on the outside of the 

 cover, seized everything that came in his way, when the dog 

 immediately hastened to his assistance, and by their joint efforts 

 nothing escaped." 



In each of these three cases — the first being particularly interesting 

 from the often-observed process of "coaxing" or invitation — the 

 abstract idea of help, mutual help, was present to the mind of either 

 of the actors; and, moreover, in the first instance, originating in the 

 mind of one, was by him intelligibly and successfully communicated 

 to that of the other. 



I pause here to advert to a suggestion which forcibly presents 

 itself to our regard. The animals whose "doings" we have been 

 noticing might not also be able to commend their "sayings" to our 

 attention, — might have no "use of words," — but can we, in strict 

 truth and fairness, pronounce them to have been also without any 

 other " general signs," by the use of which they could succeed in 



