Reason and Instinct. 5467 



All this, too, independently of another consideration. The hapless 

 individual of our own, by comparison, exalted species, who has no 

 power of speech and none of hearing, employs signs and symbols to 

 express his ideas, to be the medium of communication not only between 

 himself and his hearing or speaking fellows, but between himself and 

 others, like himself, deaf and dumb. The bird and the beast are no 

 whit behind him in the possession and in the use of the same power 

 and medium. Hear the remarks of a close and most intelligent 

 observer: — "If, when wild geese are feeding, any enemy or the 

 slightest cause of suspicion appears, the sentry utters a low croak, 

 when the whole flock immediately run up to her, and, after a short 

 consultation, fly off. * * Thus also wild ducks, curlews, crows, and 

 almost all birds, when feeding in flocks, leave sentries on whose vigi- 

 lance the rest entirely depend, taking no heed of anything around 

 them, but feeding in conscious safety. Nor is it necessary for a cry 

 of alarm to be given, as the flock perfectly understand what is going 

 on by the actions or looks of the one who is watching, distinguishing 

 at once whether the sentry is intent on some sound or object at a 

 distance, or whether the danger is imminent and pressing. It is not 

 only by the voice and action of birds of their own kind that flocks of 

 ^ild fowl guide their actions; the startled movement or cry of a red- 

 shank or peewit is sufficient to put on wing a whole flock of geese or 

 ducks instantaneously, and also to tell exactly from what point the 

 danger is to be apprehended." ('Tour in Sutherland/ ii. 140.) 



On the whole, and giving careful and impartial consideration to the 

 infinite number and variety of facts which bear on this subject, it ap- 

 pears to me impossible to come to any other conclusion, except that 

 animals do possess adequate means of communication with each other ; 

 and that many of these means of communication are sufficient to con- 

 vey precise ideas not only to the fellow-animals of the same species, 

 but to a variety of others of different species, different genera, and 

 even different tribes. It may be quite true that these communications 

 are limited — so far as we know — to a small number of subjects, — their 

 food, the approach of danger, the means of escape, the place of refuge, 

 and the like ; but, suppose this admitted, 1 contend that the reasons 

 for such admission are, at the least, fewer, less apparent, and much 

 less cogent and convincing than those for admitting the power of com- 

 munication contended for, whether we call that power language, or by 

 any other name, or leave it without any specific name whatever. 



I now revert, very briefly, to a part of this branch of our subject 

 barely glanced at a few pages back, — I mean the power possessed by 



