Reason and Instinct. 5569 



the existence of a much greater intelligence than the latter." (Id. 

 p. 172.) Now I do not adduce these remarks and reasonings, in any 

 sense, as proving or tending to prove that because there is a striking 

 analogy between the connexion of the brain and the intellect in man, 

 and that between the brain and " the mind" or " moral and intellectual 

 capacities" in the brute, that therefore this analogy establishes the 

 identity, the oneness, of the intellectual essence of the brute and of 

 man ; but simply as considerations tending to the support of such a 

 theory. The arguments by which it is supported are of another 

 description, and may be thus stated : whatever proofs may be alleged 

 that brutes possess something beyond their mere visible, material 

 bodies, are so far proofs that the resemblance and analogy, which, to 

 so great a degree, exists between them and mankind, as to the physical 

 structure of each, and the composition and functions of their several 

 parts, not only may but must extend further yet. If sufficient or 

 reasonable ground can be shown for believing that the " something 

 beyond" which they possess is an immaterial principle, or, in other 

 words, a soul or spirit, by the same process, and to the same extent, 

 reason is shown for believing that the resemblance or analogy increases 

 so far as to extend to — at the lowest statement — intellectual essence 

 as well as physical structure : — so to betoken identity of immaterial 

 endowment (however different in degree), unless it can, at the 

 same time, be shown that there are various kinds of immaterial 

 essence, or at least probable reasons for believing so. Now this pro- 

 cess is carried out by Dr. Butler in Chapter I. of his ' Analogy of 

 Religion,' and there would be but little wisdom in any attempt of ours 

 to substitute another in place of his demonstration ; but as there is 

 reason to fear his reasonings are too long to be extracted entire, I will 

 endeavour to give an analysis of his argument, and append to it, in 

 his own words, the conclusion at which he arrives, so far as concerns 

 the immaterial principle in the brute creation. He begins by stating 

 that prior to any proofs, natural or moral, of a future life (of mankind, 

 of course) there is no distinct ground or reason, either from the 

 reason of the thing or from the analogy of nature, for apprehending 

 that we {i. e. our living powers) must be destroyed by death. For, 

 in the first place, we do not know at all on what the existence of our 

 living powers depends ; and this shows further there can no pro- 

 bability be collected, from the reason of the thing, that death will be 

 their destruction ; because their existence may depend upon some- 

 what in no degree affected by death. And, in the second place, we 

 cannot find anything in the analogy of nature to afford us ever so 

 XV. 2 G 



