5738 Reason and Instinct. 



"tingo," to dye, and is significant of the colour or quality with which 

 any object may be imbued. But what the power or quality is with 

 which the creatures are endowed whom we speak of as endowed with 

 instinct; what process of observation, reflection, abstraction or calcu- 

 lation they go through ; what conscious recollections or anticipations ; 

 what power of will they possess or exercise, we know not ; and 

 nothing is added to our knowledge of the actions, or causes of the 

 actions, of insects and other animals by saying they act from instinct. 

 By constantly using the term we imagine that we mean something 

 distinct by it ; but when we begin to reason with it or upon it we find 

 it associated with a variety of indistinct and confused impressions, 

 without any one impression sufficiently clear and permanent to make 

 an item in reasoning or calculation. 



But how is it with reason ? Is this also a term of ignorance ? It 

 will seem strange to very many to say we know not what we mean by 

 reason, so often proudly called the high prerogative, the distinguish- 

 ing faculty of man. But, give it what other names you please, bestow 

 upon it the grandest epithets, I ask, Is it susceptible of such a defini- 

 tion as shall make it a safe term in a syllogism, sufficiently clear for a 

 valid inference or a well-conducted argument ? Before you can de- 

 cide whether animals have reason, you ought to know at least what it 

 is in man, whom you acknowledge or consider to possess it. But do 

 we know what it is in man ? Is it a single power or a combination of 

 powers ? If the latter, as on a little reflection many will concede, 

 what and how many are the powers which it includes ? Here we 

 may soon lose ourselves in a very embarrassing inquiry, in which I 

 fear the metaphysicians, and the great Locke among them, furnish but 

 little help. Let us proceed with caution. 



When we say that man is endowed with reason, I do not question 

 but we know what we mean with sufficient exactness for ordinary 

 converse, and the business of life to which that converse applies, be- 

 cause we experience in ourselves and we observe in others the powers 

 which are esteemed and called rational ; and we exercise these powers, 

 and observe their exercise, freely and constantly. But when we try 

 to separate them from one another, and to distinguish them, when so 

 separated, by specific names or marks, — in short, to analyze the com- 

 plex idea associated with the term reason ; — when we try to ascertain 

 and describe, with precision and exactness, any one of the many dif- 

 fering and complex processes of thought and action which come 

 under the term rational, which are equally entitled to the term, and 

 equally characteristic of the being to whom it is peculiarly applied ; 



