Reason and Instinct. 5739 



then I conceive we put ourselves upon a course of inquiry into which 

 very few have entered, and in which the many would find themselves 

 at once utterly lost. 



But it is something to know and to acknowledge that the term rea- 

 son is significant of a vast variety of complex processes of thought 

 and action, — that it is significant, not of any one definite and uniform 

 development of power or powers, but of a combination of attributes 

 and powers, varying indefinitely and unascertainably, in the nations, 

 the families and the individuals of the human race. 



If this be fully and clearly seen and acknowledged, we are on the 

 road for determining how far the brutes possess reason ; for the inquiry 

 resolves itself into this, — What powers have they analogous in kind 

 or degree to those possessed by man ? — and if there be any peculiar 

 combination of powers in man to which the term reason is or ought 

 to be applied and rigidly confined, what living beings, other than man, 

 have this peculiar combination ? 



We speak sometimes of the higher and lower functions of reason ; 

 and Mr. Atkinson speaks (Zool. 5456) of estimating the " degree or 

 kind of exercise of reason, from its simplest manifestation to its some- 

 what more complicated operation." But such language does not 

 quite satisfy the exact scientific inquirer. He may wish to feel quite 

 sure that he understands what is the " simplest manifestation" and 

 what the " more complicated operation " of reason. 



Has reason its root in sensation, as Locke seems in the main 

 to teach, ^and to teach, too, though obscurely, even in the passages 

 quoted by Mr. Atkinson ? Then all sentient beings have that ele- 

 ment in common with man, when they feel, and perceive they live. 

 But is reason something beyond and above sensation ? Is it rational 

 to remember and to anticipate, to take measures for the renewal of 

 sensation, whether to ward off evil or secure pleasure ? Who will 

 deny to the different races of animated being, in different degrees, 

 these elements of reason ? — who will say they have not memory, anti- 

 cipation, and a power of provision ? Is it an element of reason 

 to communicate sensations and ideas by signs ? Who will deny to 

 animals, in degrees, the limits of which cannot be accurately fixed, 

 the power of communicating emotions and intentions ? But is rea- 

 son something higher still, something beyond the power of communi- 

 cating ideas, emotions and intentions by articulate sounds, or marks 

 and signs previously agreed upon, and therefore understood ? Is it 

 the power of tracing effects to their causes, of classifying and arranging 

 the results of observation, of recognizing and obeying law ? Here 



