5740 Reason and Instinct. 



we approach to some of the highest attributes, we touch the nobler 

 functions and higher attainments of the human intellect in its more 

 perfect forms ; and then we may ask, with triumph, who brings evi- 

 dence for, or supposes the existence of, these functions and these 

 attainments in other tribes of animated beings, curious and wonder- 

 ful as their peculiar or characteristic qualities and powers^occasion- 

 ally may be. 



On the whole, may we not conclude that it is rather by the degree 

 and the variety and the perfection of his powers, exercised in combi- 

 nation with one another, that man is distinguished from other deni- 

 zens of the globe on which he walks, than by any one kind of quality 

 or specific attribute absolutely peculiar. And, as Home Tooke was 

 wont to say, as 1 have heard, that no definition could be given of man 

 which would suffice to distinguish him from other animals, on account 

 of the immense variety of qualities or parts, both as regards bodily 

 frame, vital function and mental powers, which he had in common 

 with the creatures around him, the term man standing sometimes for 

 the whole and sometimes for portions, more or less important, of these 

 qualities and powers, or parts and degrees thereof; so, w r ith regard to 

 the term reason, I conceive no adequate idea can be formed or 

 account given of it, because it includes such a great variety of pro- 

 cesses of thought, and has itself so many attributes, some of which 

 may be found in and may be characteristic of the higher orders of 

 animals, though other processes and attributes may not, at least in 

 any marked degree, or in anything like the perfection of their develop- 

 ment in man. 



In conclusion, permit me to suggest that Mr. Atkinson seems to 

 have embarrassed his subject, or hindered arrival at a satisfactory 

 conclusion, by his references to Locke. Mr. Atkinson's quotations 

 are taken from the 9th, 10th and 11th chapters of the second book of 

 Locke's ' Essay,' one of its least valuable portions. In these Locke 

 laid himself open to the successful attack of Bishop Berkeley, who 

 exposed Locke's weakness on the subject of abstract and universal 

 and general ideas. What, for example, can be more unsatisfactory 

 or less precise than Locke's intimation that " beasts compare not their 

 ideas further than some sensible circumstances annexed to the objects 

 themselves " ? 



The truth is that Locke wrote his great and invaluable work at dis- 

 tant intervals. It was often laid by and often resumed. When he 

 wrote this part of his ' Essay ' the vast importance of words in rea- 

 soning, and the necessity of definition, the matter upon which he 



