Reason and Instinct. 5741 



touched in the third and fourth books, had scarcely dawned upon his 

 mind; and he was not careful to correct what he says of perception, 

 comparison, retention, abstraction, composition, &c, in one place 

 speaking of them as distinct faculties of the mind, by his clearer 

 thoughts and better expressions in another place. My habitual vene- 

 ration for the name of Locke leads me often to wish that it were less 

 difficult than it is to separate the ore from the dross, the wheat from 

 the chaff, in his great work ; the more so as the ore is the gold 

 of Ophir, and the wheat the element of the bread of life. 



Edward Tagart. 

 Wikhvood, Hampstead, 

 April 2, 1857. 



Addendum. 



Should you think the observations on Reason and Instinct which 

 were forwarded to you after the appearance of Mr. Atkinson's first 

 paper worthy of any attention, perhaps you will permit a few addi- 

 tions to them, now that I have had the pleasure of reading Mr. Atkin- 

 son's concluding paper. I do not wish to controvert any of the opi- 

 nions which your correspondent has expressed, or the conclusions at 

 which he arrives, but rather to submit to his consideration, and to that 

 of other readers of the 'Zoologist' who may be disposed to enter into 

 such inquiries, the possibility, and the desirableness, if possible, of 

 giving to the discussion a more exact and scientific form than it usually 

 assumes. Our language on the phenomena of the mind, — on all which 

 is included under the term " mental action," whether we have refe- 

 rence to the human mind or to the humbler races, — is for the most part 

 too vague and indefinite to permit of any logical argument or scien- 

 tific conclusion, owing to the extreme complexity and subtlety of the 

 matter under discussion. We are perpetually in clanger of losing 

 sight of the simple, unquestionable facts of Nature, which alone are 

 of value in coming at any safe general principle, because we are carried 

 away by words which we imagine to be clear and expressive, and 

 with which we are satisfied because they are familiar. But the words 

 which are good enough for the purpose of common intercourse are not 

 adequate to the needs and uses of the exact scientific inquirer. 



It is rather as a logician and metaphysician than as a naturalist that 

 I venture to address these few lines to you, and far more with a view 



