FOREST, FISH AND GAME COMMISSIONER. 393 



tion and the judgment thereon, the title of the land alleged to be owned 

 by the State and upon which the trespass in question occurred, was con- 

 firmed in Ferris J. Meigs, the lessor of the defendant company, and the 

 stipulation provided for a deeding of other lands in the forest preserve 

 to the State as a part of the compromise and settlement. Upon the first 

 hearing of this motion, the Attorney-General, in open court, refused the 

 request of the general counsel for the Forest, Fish and Game Commis- 

 sion to act with him in asking to have the said judgment vacated, because 

 the Attorney-General wished, as he said, to raise sharply the question 

 whether he had the absolute and exclusive right to prosecute and defend 

 every action and proceeding in which the people were interested and insisted 

 that the statute authorizing the Forest, Fish and Game Commission to 

 employ an attorney to prosecute the action in question was unconstitu- 

 tional. The Attorney-General having asked to be substituted as attorney 

 of record and having refused to appear except by virtue of his absolute 

 and exclusive right to be substituted as attorney, the Court, at Special 

 Term, considered that question only, and held that the Forest, Fish and 

 Game Commission had power under the statute without the consent of 

 the Attorney-General to employ attorneys to prosecute actions to prevent 

 injury or trespass to the Forest Preserve and that it was not the exclusive 

 right, constitutional or otherwise, of the Attorney-General to prosecute 

 such actions (55 Misc. 507). From the order denying the motion of the 

 Attorney-General to be substituted as attorney of record, an appeal was 

 taken to the Appellate Division, Third Department, and this court sus- 

 tained the decision of the Special Term, holding that the Attorney-General 

 had not the constitutional right to be substituted as such attorney of 

 record and the proceeding was remitted to the Special Term for hearing 

 upon its merits as to that part of the motion which sought to vacate and 

 set aside the judgment and all proceedings after the answer. 



Mr. Justice Kellogg of the Appellate Division in referring to the con- 

 tention of the Attorney-General as to his constitutional right to represent 

 all the State departments and bureaus and to prosecute and defend all 

 actions for and against the people of the State, said: 



' The Special Term denied the motion but without prejudice to the 

 renewal thereof upon the part of the plaintiff to vacate the judgment upon 



