FISHERIES, GAME AND FORESTS. 445 



The land now in question was sold by the Comptroller to the State, October 12, 1877 ; the 

 time allowed by law for redeeming the land from that sale expired October 12, 1879; the 

 Comptroller's deed to the State was made June 9, 1881, and recorded June 8, 1882. It had 

 therefore been on record for three years when the statue of June 9, 1885, was passed and took 

 effect; and by the terms of this statute, on December 9, 1885, the Comptroller's deed became 

 conclusive evidence that there was no irregularity in the assessment of any of the taxes for 

 non-payment of which the land had been sold and conveyed to the State. This action was 

 brought April n, 1887. 



The statute, according to its principal intent and effect, and as construed by the Court of 

 Appeals of the State, was a statute of limitations. People v. Turner, 117 N. Y. 227; Same v. 

 Same, 145 N. Y. 451. It is well settled that a statute shortening the period of limitation is 

 within the constitutional power of the legislature, provided a reasonable time, taking into con- 

 sideration the nature of the case, is allowed for bringing an action after the passage of the 

 statute and before the bar takes effect. Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 632, 633; In re 

 Brown, 135 U. S. 701, 705-707. 



The statute now in question relates to land sold and conveyed to the State for non-payment 

 of taxes; it applies to those cases only in which the conveyance has been of record for two 

 years in the office where all conveyances of lands within the county are recorded ; and it does 

 not bar any action begun within six months after its passage. Independently of the considera- 

 tion rhat before the passage of the statute the plaintiff had had eight years since the sale, and 

 three years since the recording of the deed, during which he might have asserted his title, this 

 court concurs with the highest court of the State in the opinion that the limitation of six months, 

 as applied to a case of this kind, is not repugnant to any provision of the Constitution of the 

 United States. 



It was argued in behalf of the plaintiff in error that the statute was unconstitutional, because 

 it did not allow him any opportunity to assert his rights, even within six months after its passage. 

 But the statute did not take away any right of action which he had before its passage, but merely 

 limited the time within which he might assert such a right. Within the six months, he had every 

 remedy which he would have had before the passage of the statute. If he had no remedy 

 before, the statute took none away. From the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the case at 

 bar, and in the subsequent case of People v. Roberts, 151 N. Y. 540, there would appear to have 

 been some difference of opinion in that court upon the question whether his proper remedy was 

 by direct application to the Comptroller to cancel the sale, or by action of ejectment against the 

 Comptroller or the Forest Commissioners. But as that court has uniformly held that he had a 

 remedy, it is not for us to determine what that remedy was under the local constitution and laws. 



It was also argued that the plaintiff in error was in possession of the land and could not be 

 put to his action. But the decision below that he was not in possession involved no Federal 

 question, or any other question of law, but a mere inference of fact from the evidence, which this 

 court is not authorized to review on writ of error. Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658 ; Egan v. 

 Hart, 165 U. S. 188. Judgment affirmed. 



For statement of facts and other information as to this case see Annual Report, 

 State Forest Commission, 1890, pp. 153-160, People vs. Turner, Supreme Court, 

 opinion of Hand, referee. 



