184 7. J Bhdsha Pariche'da, or Division of Language. 161 



stance ; if quality were independent of another, it could not represent 

 another, whose quality it is. The existence of substance must therefore 

 be absolute, that is to say, not dependent upon the existence of 

 another ; for in this case, it would not be comprehended by the notion of 

 substance, but by that of quality. And consequently, to think the idea 

 of substance by any notions including dependance, is a contradiction. 

 This contradiction (of comprehending substance under the notion of 

 quality, and therefore) was committed by the Nyaya by its distinction 

 between eternal and non-eternal substances, because the existence of 

 the latter is not independent. In the notion of eternal substance, how- 

 ever, the true notion of substance is included, which is to be independent 

 of time and cause. 



Another question is, how a substance is united with its qualities ? 

 That a substance should have qualities, appears a matter of course, and 

 to question it, shows a vast progress in metaphysical thinking. Al- 

 though the Nyaya entered not expressly into the discussion of this sub- 

 ject, it must have felt its weight, as they found it necessary to invent a 

 contrivance for such a connexion. A substance is, according to them, 

 united with its qualities by a relation, called intimate union, which is 

 something real, and is neither in substances, nor qualities, nor actions. 

 We do not intend here to analyze this notion any further (stating, how- 

 ever, that the difficulty is not really removed by it,) but we turn to a 

 third point in the notion of substance. Substance, according to the 

 Nyaya, is not only united with its qualities by the relation, just mention- 

 ed, but all substances are united with the general notion of substance, 

 and single substances in the same way with the notion of their own 

 class. This general notion rather is a common property ; for it does 

 exist, independent of the mind, in the substances (also in qualities and 

 actions) themselves, and is even eternal in eternal substances, not eter- 

 nal in transient substances. This notion exactly corresponds with that 

 of the so-called realists among the scholastic philosophers, who main- 

 tained the reality of general notions. Duns Scotus, for instance, asserted, 

 that general properties (notions) were not only in objects potentia, but 

 acta, and that generality was not only formed by the understanding, 

 but that it existed previously to the mental conception per se as a reality, 

 viz., The quiddity itself, which was indifferent to general or individual 

 existence. A cause, however, was required to remove this indifference, 



