162 Bhdsha Pariche'da, or Division of Language. [Feb. 



viz. Another more extensive quiddity, closely united with the first, and 

 with the principle of inviduity (afterwards called haecceity).* Substances, 

 as before said, according to the Nyaya, are either eternal or non- eternal. 

 Eternal are space, time, ether, soul, and the atoms of mind, earth, water, 

 fire, and air. Non- eternal are all compounds, or the things which we 

 actually perceive, and which must have a cause of their existence. Thus 

 substances are divided into those which are without cause, and those 

 which have a cause. 



There are three causes; — 1. The cause of aggregation, or material 

 cause, as yarn is the material cause of cloth ; — 2. The proximate cause, 

 or the actual union of the parts which are to form a compound; — and 

 3. The instrumental cause, viz. the cause by which this union is effected. 



This is similar to the doctrine of Aristotle, who admitted four causes ; 

 a material cause, a moving cause, a formal cause, and an end cause. 

 The instrumental cause includes Aristotle's formal, moving, and end 

 causes. 



The notion of causality is certainly well considered, and infinitely su- 

 perior to the notions which other Indian systems formed of it ; for there 

 are already made some steps in advance towards the proper discussion 

 of this notion, if a difference in causes is acknowledged. In the enume- 

 ration of causes — the cause of motion appears to have been omitted : it 

 is, however, contained in the notion of instrumental causality. All ac- 

 tivity according to the Nyaya is limited to movement, acts of the mind 

 being considered by them as qualities, and as all actions abide in sub- 

 stances, we must consider every substance as a cause of motion. They 

 did not, however discuss, whether motion was necessary to all sub- 

 stances, or only to some or to one, that is to say, whether there is a 

 primum mobile or not ; they did not discuss the question whether 

 different motions do not require different causes; nor did they lastly 

 enter into an explanation of the notion itself, f They appear in fact not 

 to have been aware of the intrinsic difficulties of the idea of causality, 



* Vid. Tennemann's Geschichte der Philosophic. Kerte Aufl. p. 256. 



f The contradictions which Zeno found in the notion of movement, are well known, 

 and without fully acknowledging their weight, it is impossible to obtain a correct notion 

 of it. Aristotle was well aware of this, and endeavoured to remove Zeno's objections 

 to this notion. How important, however, it is, correctly to define this notion, is 

 evident even from the influence, which it exercised on the Nyaya, where motion is 

 considered as an act, and even as the only act. 



