1847.] Bhdsha Parichtfda, or Division of Language. 163 



which undoubtedly is one of the most difficult metaphysical notions.* 

 The contradictions in the notion of cause and effect appear with especial 

 force to apply to such causes, by which a change in the qualities of a 

 substance is effected, as chemical, animal, and psychical effects. Such 

 effects are, however, denied by the Nyaya. Material causes must be un- 

 derstood as only the substrata, or the materials for a new union, as for 

 instance, the two halves from which a pot is produced, are the material 

 cause of the pot. There are therefore no real changes, but only changes 

 of the accidental form, which substances may assume in their connexion 

 with others ; and there should not be changes at all we add. Every com- 

 pound substance, according to the Nyaya, is ultimately produced from 

 simple substances. Simple substances, however, are eternal, and all their 

 qualities are also eternal. If this is the case, there is also no change of 

 qualities in any compound substance, because by any connexion between 

 them, different from an accidental relation, they would assume changes, 

 contradictory to the notion, under which they are conceived. As the 

 Nyaya, however, admits an actual change in compound substances, in 

 which qualities, not to be met with in the simple substances, are pro- 

 duced, and moreover admits a compound, in which there is a compara- 

 tively firm connexion of the parts with each other, it has deviated from 

 its notion of causality, and is hence guilty of the contradiction which it 

 first endeavoured to escape. Notwithstanding these deficiencies of the 

 Nyaya, we still maintain, that it approached nearer than any other 

 Hindu system, to the true notion of causality, causality being, accord- 

 ing to Pantheistic, not less than to sceptical idea, a product of habit in 

 the association of our ideas. 



In passing from the general metaphysical (ontological) to more 

 special investigations (comprehending natural philosophy and psycho- 

 logy) we may first observe, that the same clearness obtains in the latter 

 as in the former. Existence, or rather to use the Greek term to ov 9 



* Vide Sext. Emp. Adv. mathem. in Hitter's History of Philos. Vol. iv. p. 339. 

 That cause could not be later than effect, is evident; but also the effect cannot be later 

 than the cause ; for if so, the cause, being antecedent to the effect, would be without 

 effect, and a cause without effect, is a contradiction. And if the effect would be conse- 

 quent to the cause, it would be, when the cause is no more, therefore an effect without 

 cause. Both therefore must be necessarily together. If this be conceded, then there is 

 the difficulty, why the one more than the other is producing (or cause). These are 

 only part of the difficulties, and without solving them, the objections made against 

 causality, are quite just. 



