164 Bhdsha Pariche'da, or Division of Language. [Feb. 



in its connexion with material and immaterial phenomena, is much more 

 distinctly conceived than in other systems of the Hindus. We find in- 

 deed the same material elements as in other systems ; viz., earth, water, 

 light, air, and ether with the same qualities ; but while in all others they 

 are only generally described, here there is made an attempt to explain the 

 special phenomena as well as the sources of our perception of them, or 

 in one word, we find here the basis of observation, and of the first 

 lineaments of the consequent reflection upon the results of that ob- 

 servation. We meet here also the first remarks about space and time, 

 and even some correct notions about their nature, and although both of 

 them are placed among the substances, we must not forget the intrinsic 

 difficulties of this subject; which in our times only has been more 

 satisfactorily investigated by Kant, Fichte, and Herbart. The error of 

 considering space and time as substances, is a consequence of the 

 notion the Nyaya had formed of substance, viz. as the substrate of 

 qualities and actions. This idea would, indeed, have been correct, had 

 the notion of existence been preserved. The Vedanta certainly had 

 a much more exact idea of existence, maintaining, that what exists 

 (to bvrwQ bv) must be simply existent, without any attribute what- 

 ever, and should strictly not be even considered by a plurality of no- 

 tions. The Vedanta, however, by denying the reality of phenomena, 

 had nothing to explain, while the Nyaya, retaining the crude notions, 

 given by observation, had no principles whereby to explain them. The 

 most interesting point in this part of the system is the investigation 

 into the nature of matter, an investigation which was indeed entered 

 into by other Hindu systems, although not with the same success. 

 The Vedanta for instance, reduced the objects of the senses, or the things, 

 composed of the gross elements, to elements, which are finer and imper- 

 ceptible to the senses, undoubtedly for the same reasons as the Nyaya, 

 viz. because the origin, the changes, and the destruction of the material 

 things compelled the mind to fix the notion of existence upon some 

 other natures, not affected by those conditions. But according to the 

 Vedanta, the simpler elements are only simple, because they are unmixed 

 with others. As regards, however, space, no reduction was made, and 

 their view on this point is very like the doctrine of Anaxagoras, who 

 also started from an original homogenousity of the elements. The 

 Vedanta indeed did not confine its thoughts to those elements, but 



