166 Bhdsha ParicMda, or Division of Language. [Feb. 



and interesting, not only because it is original, but because it shows a 

 remarkable acuteness in overcoming difficulties, met with in every sys- 

 tem, which considers substances not only as individual beings, but also 

 as a common essence that exsists, although dependent upon the indivi- 

 dual substances. To perceive individual external substances, and their 

 properties in common with others, it is necessary that the intercourse of 

 the senses with the external objects should take place accordingly, 

 that is to say, that individual substances should be perceived by the 

 connexion of the senses with these individual substances, and the com- 

 mon properties by the connexion of the senses with these common pro- 

 perties. Substances are then perceived by the soul as in their different 

 relations, viz. first, as in relation of this individual substance and this 

 individual quality, of this individual substance and this individual act, 

 further, as in the relation, which this individual substance has with its 

 class (general essence) or with its generality ; and lastly, as in the 

 relation, which this individual quality or this individual act of this indi- 

 vidual substance has with its class or generality. 



This, however is not sufficient ; for a full comprehension, there are 

 required also general notions, corresponding with those relations. A tree 

 for instance would not be perceived, without the general notion of a tree, 

 by which a tree at any place and at any time is perceived. This general 

 notion requires again a kind of special knowledge, by which the general 

 notion of a tree is referred to a certain tree. This kind of knowledge, 

 though corresponding with the relations of all substances, which have 

 both general and special properties, and though it is (implicitly) con- 

 tained in every object of perception, still differs from the general properties 

 of the things. It is a conception of the soul, produced by its own activity. 

 This knowledge then is internal perception, that is to say, it is not pro- 

 duced by inference, or analogy, or verbal communication, but it is imme- 

 diate and complete, as all knowledge by perception. Every perception 

 then, according to this exposition, is based upon two elements, an external 

 and an internal, or as these expressions do not exactly represent their 

 notions, an immediate and mediate, an objective and ideal knowledge. 

 In the same way are the objects of the soul perceived, viz. its different 

 qualities, as aversion, volition, &c. are called. Though the soul is the 

 object of the mind, it is not directly perceived by it, but it is inferred 

 from its qualities. It is not necessary here to explain the other faculties 



