1847.] Bhdsha Paricheda, or Division of Language. 167 



of intellect, viz. inference, comparison, and verbal communication, as they 

 are discussed in another part of this paper. We here only add, that they 

 must be considered as parts of the quality of knowledge, or, as we would 

 express it, as modified operations of one and the same mental activity. 



The mind, by which all knowledge is perceived, is not a quality or 

 faculty of the soul itself, but it is an independent substance, atomistic 

 in its nature. Hence only a single perception or idea is at one time 

 perceived by the soul. 



The soul itself is eternal, and therefore so also are its qualities, we 

 should say, also its knowledge, although this knowledge be not perceived 

 by the soul itself. It is at the same time every where, not, however, as 

 an infinite soul, as the universal soul of the Vedanta, where all things 

 constitute the pervading soul, be it even a piece of matter, though 

 bound by ignorance to a state of apparent material existence, but 

 according to the Nyaya there are infinite units of soul every where pre- 

 sent, through all the worlds of material creation. There is a general soul, 

 and there are individual souls. The general soul has the same qualities 

 with the individual souls, with the exception of aversion, pleasure, pain, 

 merit and demerit, because these qualities would involve imperfections. 

 The individual soul is subject to the law of transmigration, and happi- 

 ness and misery are the consequences of its good or bad actions. It is, 

 however, possible for the individual soul to emerge from the vicissitudes 

 of worldly existence by the attainment of true knowledge. 



It would be superfluous to point out the marked distinction, drawn 

 here, between body and soul. Though a higher development of philoso- 

 phy may destroy the distinctions between soul and matter, that is, 

 may recognise matter, or what is perceived as matter, as the same with 

 the soul (as for instance Leibnitz did), it is nevertheless certain, that no 

 true knowledge of the soul is possible, without first drawing a most 

 decided line of demarcation between the phenomena of matter and of 

 the soul. In the Nyaya there is even an approximation to the doctrine, 

 that soul and matter are as to their principles one and the same, viz. in 

 the theory of atoms, according to which atoms are the negation of space. 

 From this notion we may draw the inference, which has not been drawn 

 by the Nyaya, it is true, but which would have been only a necessary con- 

 sequence from the premises, that matter, being a compound of atoms, is 

 only a phenomenon, as regards its extension through space. Where then 



