168 Bhdsha Paricheda, or Division of Language. [Feb. 



is here shown the difference between the soul and the true substratum of 

 matter ? Let us see then, what is the soul ? The soul is different from mat- 

 ter, as this last is perceived by the senses as extended through space. This 

 distinction is true, but further to conclude, that the soul is also different 

 from matter in its real nature, where matter is not extended, is certainly- 

 hasty, and does not follow from the premises. What then is the soul ac- 

 cording to them ? It is all-pervading, infinite, like ether, space and time. 

 This answer, though far from satisfactory, shows, that they felt the diffi- 

 culty in determining the notion of the soul, when their other notions had 

 undergone a decided alteration. The most peculiar notion in their psy- 

 chological theory is the existence of the mind independent of the soul, 

 although most intimately connected with it ; for through the mind only 

 the soul perceives, as well its own qualities, as the qualities of external 

 substances. How could the Nyaya have made a supposition in which 

 the contradiction is so evident ? For it is easy to conclude, that if the 

 mind is independent, its perception is also independent. If the mind 

 perceives, this perception is not in the soul, and if this perception is in 

 the soul, it is not perceived. The soul then has knowledge, which is not 

 real knowledge, because not perceived, and the mind has no knowledge, 

 though it perceives. 



We may solve this difficulty at least in some way. The mind was 

 first undoubtedly considered as an internal sense according to the ana- 

 logy of external senses, in order that there be a unity of perception, and 

 also that, as the external objects are perceived through different media, 

 so the objects of the soul be perceived through an analogous internal 

 medium, a supposition, which has also been made in modern (English) 

 philosophy. So far the Nyaya might have also considered the mind as 

 an internal sense, but they met with a difficulty, which was not felt in the 

 same intensity by modern philosophers. If the knowledge be perceived 

 by the soul through the medium of the mind (the internal sense), why 

 is knowledge not always present in the mind ? why does it disappear and 

 give place to other objects of perception ? Locke was surprised at the 

 narrowness of the human mind, without being able to account for it ; 

 the Nyaya in endeavouring to account for it, invented an independent 

 substance, the mind, which is an atom, and according to its atomistic 

 nature is only able to represent or to perceive one object at one and the 

 same time. 



