1847.] Bhdsha Pariche'da, or Division of Language. 169 



This, I think, is the solution of the difficulty, and though it is cer- 

 tainly only an evasion, because its supposition creates greater difficulties 

 than the former one, it still gives evidence of a spirit of enquiry in the 

 school. 



In comparing the psychological theory of the Nyaya with more 

 modern doctrines (with the exception of the latest period) we must 

 admit, that in a metaphysical point of view there is no great difference 

 between them. The same objections are to be made to either. The 

 doctrine of faculties being involved in the same contradictions as that of 

 qualities. In either case, if you are to explain, what the soul is, you 

 have to state, what it is, independent of its qualities or faculties, and 

 also to enumerate the latter. Your explanation will thus point out a 

 quale, which is not a unity, but something denned by a variety of no- 

 tions. This, however, is not the place to discuss the matter and we 

 wished only to show, that modern philosophy in this respect cannot 

 boast to have advanced one single step beyond that of the Hindus, that 

 is to say, in the metaphysic of the soul, although it would be absurd to 

 deny, that modern psychology, as to the observation of psychical pheno- 

 mena, has made rapid strides, towards perfection. 



In passing over to the strictly logical enquiries of the Nyaya, we have 

 to premise, that we cannot view them with the same satisfaction, and 

 although we make ample allowance for the different forms of language, 

 in which they were explained, we are compelled to confess, that they 

 are neither exact nor complete. 



The Nyaya has treated the logical topics in the inverse order of that 

 adopted by us, viz. first inference, then ideas, and lastly propositions. 

 This order is followed, not in consequence of a different method of ar- 

 rangement, but in consequence of the subjects being based upon different 

 grounds, and flowing from different sources. Logic might undoubtedly 

 be treated analytically and commence with the exposition of syllogisti- 

 cal forms. Considering argument as a fact, we might analyse various 

 arguments, and proceeding to their elements, that is to propositions, 

 gradually arrive at ideas or notions. But the Nyaya, far from following 

 such an analytical course, holds inference to be a quality, different from 

 the quality of forming names and notions, and discusses inference before 

 verbal knowledge, evidently with the purpose of showing, that the latter 

 in some way depends upon the former. 



