170 Bhdsha Parichida, or Division of Language. [Feb. 



We, however, treat these doctrines in their common order, with no 

 other intention than to make ourselves better understood. 



Verbal knowledge is one of the divisions of intellect. The first act 

 or the first condition of understanding words, is the forming of the 

 name ! A name is corresponding to a certain object, and this object is 

 connected with the name by the power of the name. A name which has 

 such a power, is a word. The clear and distinct knowledge of what is 

 implied in a word, is produced by a third act, and is the meaning of a 

 word. This latter is in fact identical with idea or notion, as is evident 

 from the examples given, as for instance, a tree is a thing which has 

 root, stem, branches, leaves, etc. 



Here again is the order perverted, the name is certainly not, the first 

 operation, and the object to be named, the second, but just the reverse. 

 There must be objects to be named, and though we may admit, that the 

 clear idea of a subject often succeeds a name, still the object, of which 

 the notion is formed, is the first, and we must assert, that what precedes 

 the notion, also precedes the name. 



The enquiry, how ideas are formed from a variety of like objects, 

 belongs to psychology, and however interesting this question otherwise 

 may be, logic has nothing to do with the psychical process, by which 

 ideas are produced. If this were the case, we might still have to wait for 

 a logic, as a psychological theory has not yet been established to general 

 satisfaction, while logic as a science has been completed for more than 

 two thousand years. By considering the names and afterwards the 

 corresponding notions, the real character of a notion has been at least 

 obscured. From the given examples we see, that a notion, instead of 

 being defined by the genus, under which it is contained, and the specific 

 difference, is explained by a genus, which is distant from it by a number 

 of intervening notions (for instance, genus of tree = thing) and by a 

 specific difference, which besides its own difference, enumerates properties 

 which it partakes with others (for instance root, stem, leaves, etc.=speci- 

 fic difference.) 



The meaning of a word or idea, ought to have been considered in its 

 connexion with other ideas, as made up by genus and differentia specifica, 

 the co-ordination and subordination of ideas, as their compatible, contra- 

 ry, and contradictory opposition. Here, however, are genus and species 

 raised to categories under the names of generality and particularity, 



