1847.] Bhdsha Paricheda, or Division of Language. 173 



The third step is, that such a smoke from which fire is inferrible, is on 

 the hill : and the fourth step, the actual connexion of the fire with the 

 hill, that is, the hill is fiery. 



The error in this exposition is the confounding logical correctness 

 with truth. The Nyaya perceived very well, that the terminus medius by 

 its being separatedly connected with two other ideas or denied of one, 

 connected or separated these two ideas, — which is the real operation in 

 arguing ; but at the same time they wanted to guard against false pre- 

 mises or a false conclusion, and for this purpose they required a consi- 

 deration, which was to establish the truth of the preposition major by a 

 reference to an instance, in which the truth of this premise was exem- 

 plified. Their investigation was therefore not only directed to the logical 

 operation of arguing, but also to the truth, which may result from it, 

 and both the truth of the conclusion, and the correctness of the argu- 

 ment, should be the result of one and the same operation, which of 

 course is impossible. We would not so much object to this process on 

 the ground, that it is tedious, and useless, as regards the syllogism 

 itself (for it may be good to draw the attention of the beginner not only 

 to the special connexion of the ideas in the syllogistical form, but also 

 to the truth of the premises) but on the ground, that it is considered 

 only valid by giving an instance. Hence arguing is not allowed, where 

 no instance can be given, by which not only an undue restriction takes 

 place, but also, in some cases at least, four ideas are introduced. 



Another error is, that by inference not only a new connexion of ideas 

 is to be given, but also a new association of an object, which is perceived, 

 with something, that is not perceived, as for instance smoke, which is 

 perceived, with fire, which is not perceived. Here then, it appears, i^s 

 inference limited to objects, at present in our perception. Though this 

 is denied in the later expositions of the Nyaya, and is expressly stated 

 as an error of the earlier philosophers of the school, still perception is not 

 omitted as a necessary condition of inference, which must of course 

 confine syllogisms to a much narrower circle than is according to their 

 nature. 



The third error, which has a close communion with the first, is the 

 confounding of the logical relation between argument and conclusion, 

 with the relation between cause and effect. All the examples given to 

 illustrate syllogisms, do not represent a connexion between ideas, in 



2 A 



