174 Bhdsha Paricheda, or Division of Language. [Feb. 



which the relations are those of notions, that is to say, either excluded 

 from each other, or contained in a higher one, but in the relation of 

 cause and effect, and vice versa, which may certainly be expressed in a 

 syllogism, but only in one kind of syllogism, viz. in a conditional one. 

 That this error is not owing to the examples, but to the doctrine itself, 

 is proved by Goutama's division of syllogisms, which are either passing 

 from the cause to its effect, or consequent, passing from the effect to its 

 cause, or from general notions. An inference of the first kind is, when 

 rain is inferred from a collection of clouds, of the second, from the 

 increase of water in a river to rain, of the third, from the notion of earth 

 to the notion of a substance. This latter would indeed answer a rela- 

 tion in the notions themselves, but it is of minor importance, and it has 

 been even omitted in later treatises. 



If even the nature of a syllogism be not expressed in its precise logical 

 form by the Nyaya, we much less can expect to find here a complete 

 enumeration of the various kinds of syllogisms. Goutama's division 

 of syllogisms has been just adverted to, and it is hardly necessary to 

 remark, that this division is not logical. In later treatises of the Nyaya 

 syllogisms are divided into positive and negative ones, and from the 

 examples given in illustration it appears, that the two -first syllogistical 

 forms are represented by them ; here, however, is their theory finished, 

 and we find no trace of the different moods the syllogistical forms can 

 enter into. 



It is a remarkable circumstance, that the general form of a syllogism 

 should have been found by the Hindus, and yet that they still should not 

 have discovered the different forms and moods, the diversities of which 

 are the result of a mere combination. This is the more remarkable, as 

 in their philosophical arguing we almost invariably find a syllogism 

 expressed in an enthymematical form, where the conclusion and the 

 terminus medius are given, by which the force of an argument is not 

 only forthwith apparent, but even a certain elegance produced, and this 

 even without referring to an instance. We think, that this deficiency 

 was the consequence of two causes especially — first, they were unable 

 to disengage themselves from the grammatical forms in which human 

 ideas are expressed, as shown by their technical logical language, which 

 though as precise as possible, is not clear but cumbrous and not com- 

 prehensive, and secondly, from their pious regard for every thing tradi- 



