1845.] Vedanta-Sara, or Essence of the Veddnta. 107 



noza. His Bramha is that infinite substance with infinite attributes, 

 beside which there is nought else existing, though he so far differs from 

 the modern Vedantists as to assign to it two attributes, that of thought, 

 and that of extension, which the Vedantists of that school deny the 

 existence of. 



They maintain a perfect Ens or a real unity without any element of 

 opposite qualities. Spinoza indeed asserts, that his Ens Cogitans is 

 identical with the Ens Extensum, difference existing only in the percep- 

 tion of the whole under the one or under the other attribute ; but on 

 the other hand he also asserts, that each attribute must be understood 

 of itself, that is to say, that it has no relation whatever to any other 

 attribute.* Though the Vedanta philosophy in this instance is evidently 

 more strict in the definition of the principle, it deviates from the origi- 

 nal purity of its notion, when attempting to explain the phenomena of 

 its world. 



Both systems present likewise a singular coincidence in the mode, 

 by which they connect finite things with infinite substance. Spinoza 

 declares it altogether impossible to derive finite things from infinite 

 subtance, because any finite substance is only finite, if determined by 

 another substance of the same kind, that is, infinite substance is always 

 co-existent with finite things, f The Vedanta-Sara maintains also, that 

 the perception of Bramha as one whole or as many parts, depends merely 

 on the accident of that perception ; if perceived as one, it would be one ; 

 if perceived as many, it would be many ; but in the latter case the unity 

 of entity would be in no sort destroyed or altered. Here likewise we 

 find a plurality of material objects, not derived from the one whole (which 

 has the attributes of infinity, eternity, &c.,) but co-existent in it, so 



* Though it should be hardly necessary to make quotations in such a general 

 sketch as this, still it may be not found useless to confirm some of the above as- 

 sertions. Per attributum intelligo id, quod intellectum de substantia percipit, tan- 

 quam ejus essentian constituens. Spin. Eth. I. Def. 4. Unumquodque unius sub- 

 stantias attributum per se concipi debet. Eth. Prop. 10. Duae attributa, realiter 

 distincta, per se concipiuntur, idest, unum sine ope alterius. Eth. Def. 3. 



t Quodcunque singulare sive quavis res, quae finita est et determinatam ha?bet ex- 

 istentiam, non potest existere nee ad operaudum determicari, nisi ad existendum et 

 operandum determinetur ab alia causa, quae etiam finita est, et determinatam habet 

 existentiam ; et rursus haec causan on potest etiam existere, neque ad operandum 

 determinari, nisi ab alia, quae etiam finita est et determiuetur ad existendum et ope- 

 randum, et sic in infinitum. Eth. 1. Prop. 28. 



