124 Veddnta-Sara, or Essence of the Ve'ddnta. [No. 158. 



the Sruti says, " Another internal soul is knowledge," because 

 there is no action of the organs, when there is no ruler (first mover,) 

 and because he thinks, I am enjoying, asserts, that the understand- 

 ing is the soul. Prabhakaras and logicians, because the Sruti says, 

 " another internal soul is pleasure, because it is evident, that igno- 

 rance destroys the understanding, and because they think, we are ig- 

 norant, we know, assert, that ignorance is the soul. , 



The followers of Bhatta, because the Sruti says, "The soul is 

 knowledge as pleasure," because in deep sleep manifestation and 

 also non-manifestation take place, and because they think, we do 

 not know ourselves, assert, that the soul, in which unconsciousness is 

 inherent, is the soul. 



Another Baudha, because the Sruti says, " This (universe) was 

 before (the creation) nothing," because in deep sleep there remains 

 nothing, and because he who awakes, naturally thinks, I did not 

 exist in deep sleep, asserts, that the soul is nothing. 



In all those assertions, commencing with the son and terminating 

 with the nothing, (void) the soul is asserted to be what really is not the 

 soul. As the apparent arguments from the Sruti, inference and obser- 

 vation, which commence from the common assertion of the son, clear- 

 ly show, that one argument from the Sruti, inference and obser- 

 vation is refuted by arguments of the same kind, it is evident, that 

 the soul is not the son, &c. That the soul is not mind, not a first 

 mover, that it is mere knowledge, mere existence, follows from the 

 contradiction of a much more powerful Sruti, it follows from the rea- 

 son, that all those inanimate principles from the son up to the void, 

 by having their existence only through the manifestation of the soul, 

 are transient like all material beings, and also, that there is much greater 

 authority in the thought of the wise : I am Bramha. It is therefore 

 evident from the contradiction of these arguments from the Sruti, 

 inference and observation, that none of these principles is the soul. 

 Therefore the eternal, pure, omniscient, free, true, self-existent (or 



Jdgacharas. Others, again, affirm the actual existence of external objects no less 

 than internal sensations. Some of them recognise the immediate perception of in- 

 terior objects. Others contend for a mediate apprehension of them. Hence two 

 branches of the sect of Buddha, one denominated Sautrantica, the other Vaibha- 

 shica. 



