EDITOR'S TABLE. 



125 



not be equally absurd for bim to call 

 himself a " believer," or a " doubter," or 

 an "opiner"? Surely be is all tbree, 

 eacb in its turn ; and, wbetber in be- 

 lieving, or in doubting, or in opining, 

 he is equally maintaining his intellectual 

 integrity. Taking this view of the mat- 

 ter, we have not hitherto been able to 

 regard the " agnostic " position as very 

 well or happily chosen by many, at 

 least, of those who profess to hold it. 

 We think, for example, that " agnostic " 

 is a poor name for such a man as Prof. 

 Huxley to be known by. Prof. Huxley 

 is a man of a decidedly positive and 

 constructive cast of mind, a man eager 

 to affirm all the truths that he can es- 

 tablish. If he makes a stand for any- 

 thing, it is for intellectual integrity. To 

 him it is a crime to believe without evi- 

 dence, or to disbelieve in spite of evi- 

 dence. In this respect he is entirely 

 at one with the excellent Nicole, whose 

 words we have quoted. Why should a 

 man of this kind be separated by any 

 badge or party nickname from the com- 

 munity at large ? His one great interest 

 is the truth, and what nobler interest 

 can any man have? Or, again, what 

 profounder basis of sympathy and union 

 can any two men, or any body of men, 

 have, than a common and ardent love 

 of the truth ? Mere outward agreement 

 in opinion counts for little, unless there 

 is sincerity at the back of it. It is im- 

 possible, at least for any enlightened 

 man, to derive satisfaction from the 

 support of those who, he knows, have 

 no interest in the truth, and who are 

 prepared to defend the opinions they 

 have embraced by all kinds of party 

 strategy. 



The highest profession any man can 

 make is a profession of intellectual integ- 

 rity ; and to us it seems to be sufficient 

 for all purposes. It is one which a man 

 can summon others to share. It be- 

 comes at once the basis of a true apos- 

 tolate. "Believe what you may," cries 

 the true modern thinker, "disbelieve 

 what you may, only make it a sacred 



principle that your beliefs shall be hon est, 

 and shall be advocated and defended by 

 honest arguments and none other." It 

 may seem to some that this is an appeal 

 easily made, a programme easily real- 

 ized. Possibly, but it demands this: 

 that underneath every opinion and be- 

 lief shall be a fundamental sense, ac- 

 quiring gradually the force of an instinct, 

 that the ultimate object of loyalty and 

 devotion is the truth. Truth, if we may 

 so express it, must own the soil of the 

 mind, and opinions and beliefs must be 

 merely tenants occupying according to 

 the terms-of their several leases. Loyal- 

 ty to an opinion is a misleading phrase, 

 and one that ought to be banished from 

 the vocabulary of honest men. The 

 only true and worthy loyalty is to that 

 which alone can vitalize any opinion — 

 namely, the truth. 



If it be objected that there is no con- 

 venient name by which the brotherhood 

 of truth-lovers could be known, we an- 

 swer that the objection seems to us of 

 trifling importance. The great thing is 

 that a man should be a truth-lover, not 

 that be should have any special appella- 

 tion. The Christians " were first called 

 Christians at Antioch"; and St. Paul 

 founded churches without, apparently, 

 using or recognizing the name, which is 

 not once mentioned in his epistles. The 

 "Methodists" of the last century took 

 a name that was applied to them mainly 

 in derision by their opponents, and one 

 which certainly did not bind them to 

 any set of opinions. Let a man profess 

 and, still better, let him practice honesty 

 in all his beliefs, and let the world dub 

 him as it may. He will then be pre- 

 pared to say, when duly questioned, 

 what those things are which, following 

 the pious Nicole, he finds it a duty to 

 believe, the evidence being what it is; 

 what those things are which to his 

 honest apprehension are doubtful; and 

 what those in regard to which he is 

 moved by a greater probability to en- 

 tertain an opinion. The things that he 

 disbelieves he will also with equal frank- 



