" COWARDLY AGNOSTICISM." 245 



" surely indisputable." And truth thus understood it is " surely 

 indisputable " that we should cultivate. The reason is obvious. 

 Such truth has certain social consequences, certain things that we 

 all desire come of it; but the highest truth which Mr. Spencer 

 speaks of stands, according to him, on a wholly different basis, 

 and we are to cultivate it, not because of its consequences, but in 

 defiance of them. And what are its consequences, so far as we can 

 see ? Prof. Huxley's answer is this : " I have had, and have, the 

 firmest conviction that . . . the verace via, the straight road, has 

 led nowhere else but into the dark depths of a wild and tangled 

 forest." Now if this be the case, what possible justification can 

 there be for following this verace via ? In what sense is the man 

 who follows it playing " his right part in the world " ? And when 

 Mr. Spencer says, with regard to his conduct, " it is well," with 

 whom is it well, or in what sense is it well ? We can use such 

 language with any warrant or with any meaning only on the sup- 

 position that the universe, or the Unknowable as manifested 

 through the universe, is concerned with human happiness in some 

 special way, in which it is not concerned with human misery, and 

 that thus our knowledge of it must somehow make men happier, 

 even though it leads them into a wild and tangled forest. It is 

 certain that our devotion to truth will not benefit the universe ; 

 the only question is, will knowledge of the universe, beyond a cer- 

 tain point, benefit us ? But the supposition just mentioned is 

 merely theism in disguise. It imputes to the Unknowable design, 

 purpose, and affection. In every way it is contrary to the first 

 principles of agnosticism. Could we admit it, then devotion to 

 truth might have all the meaning that Mr. Spencer claims for it : 

 but if this supposition is denied, as all agnostics deny it, this de- 

 votion to truth, seemingly so noble and so unassailable, sinks to a 

 superstition more abject, more meaningless, and more ridiculous 

 than that of any African savage, groveling and mumbling before 

 his fetich. 



We have now passed under review the main positive argu- 

 ments by which our agnostics, while dismissing the existence of 

 God as a question of lunar politics, endeavor to exhibit the reality 

 of religion, and of duty, as a thing that is " surely indisputable." 

 We will now pass on to their negative arguments. While by 

 positive arguments they endeavor to prove that duty and religion 

 are realities, by their negative arguments they endeavor to prove 

 that duty and religion are not impossibilities. We have seen 

 how absolutely worthless to their cause are the former ; but if the 

 former are worthless, the latter are positively fatal. 



What they are the reader has already seen. I have taken the 

 statement of them from Prof. Huxley, but Mr. Spencer uses lan- 

 guage almost precisely similar. These arguments start with two 



