RAILWAY MALADJUSTMENTS. 369 



maintenance of profitable rates, and the author insists that legis- 

 lation aiming to prevent such unions or agreements or regulating 

 rates is in the nature of confiscation. This seems plausible, for it 

 is only a half -statement of the case ; as the Western granger, who 

 has granted a free right of way and voted aid for the construc- 

 tion of competing lines of railways, views such alliances as 

 treachery and dishonesty, to be prevented and punished by legal 

 penalties. 



The author of " Legislative Injustice to Railways " * condemns 

 attempts at State regulation, which from the very nature of things 

 must more or less directly interfere with interstate commerce ; 

 but, upon the whole, he is disposed to look upon the Interstate 

 Commerce Bill as a step in the right direction, and would only 

 recommend certain modifications of the anti-pooling and the long 

 and short haul clauses. But in the main this writer asks for legis- 

 lation aimed directly at the inherent dishonesty of railroad man- 

 agement; viz., he wants laws compelling directors to publish 

 truthful reports, and asks the appointment of public accountants 

 to examine and attest all reports for publication. He asks a law 

 making it incumbent upon railroads to elect at least one thor- 

 oughly trained and honest director, specially educated for the 

 purpose. He also insists on legislation " to regulate the methods 

 of construction companies," which, he says, " are probably doing 

 more to demoralize the railroad system than any other factor," 

 and he broadly intimates that these companies are nothing but 

 organized schemes for the enrichment of thrifty directors at the 

 expense of the stockholders. 



" Bribery in Railway Elections " f is an argument to show that 

 the many evils complained of are the result of systematic bribery 

 employed in the election of the directors who control the man- 

 agement of railway properties. The writer asserts that the prac- 

 tice is neither business-like nor moral, " and requires some weapon 

 more potent than argument," hence he demands enactments pre- 

 scribing heavy penalties. But surely bribery within the railway 

 company can not be the cause of demoralization, for it is but a 

 symptom of a diseased organism, and proves the evil to rest in the 

 constitution of the railway corporation itself, which is the creat- 

 ure of statute law. "What could better indicate the operation of 

 foreign and abnormal forces than this acknowledgment that our 

 railroads are controlled by forces neither "business-like nor 

 moral " ? Is it not evident that such an organism is of artificial 

 origin, and is unfitted to survive unless its business and moral 

 qualities are developed on a plane with the importance and far- 

 reaching influences of the properties controlled ? 



* Henry Clews, "North American Review," March, 1889. 

 f Isaac L. Rice, "The Forum," March, 18S9. 



