448 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



The present discussion has arisen out of the use, which has 

 become general in the last few years, of the terms " agnostic " and 

 " agnosticism." 



The people who call themselves "agnostics" have been charged 

 with doing so because they have not the courage to declare them- 

 selves " infidels." It has been insinuated that they have adopted 

 a new name in order to escape the unpleasantness which attaches 

 to their proper denomination. To this wholly erroneous imputa- 

 tion, I have replied by showing that the term " agnostic " did, as 

 a matter of fact, arise in a manner which negatives it ; and my 

 statement has not been, and can not be, refuted. Moreover, 

 speaking for myself, and without impugning the right of any 

 other person to use the term in another sense, I further say that 

 agnosticism is not properly described as a " negative " creed, nor 

 indeed as a creed of any kind, except in so far as it expresses 

 absolute faith in the validity of a principle which is as much 

 ethical as intellectual. This principle may be stated in various 

 ways, but they all amount to this : that it is wrong for a man to 

 say that he is certain of the objective truth of any proposition 

 unless he can produce evidence which logically justifies that cer- 

 tainty. This is what agnosticism asserts ; and, in my opinion, it 

 is all that is essential to agnosticism. That which agnostics deny 

 and repudiate as immoral is the contrary doctrine, that there 

 are propositions which men ought to believe, without logically 

 satisfactory evidence; and that reprobation ought to attach to 

 the profession of disbelief in such inadequately supported propo- 

 sitions. The justification of the agnostic principle lies in the suc- 

 cess which follows upon its application, whether in the field of 

 natural or in that of civil history ; and in the fact that, so far as 

 these topics are concerned, no sane man thinks of denying its 

 validity. 



Still speaking for myself, I add that, though agnosticism is 

 not, and can not be, a creed, except in so far as its general princi- 

 ple is concerned ; yet that the application of that principle results 

 in the denial of, or the suspension of judgment concerning, a 

 number of propositions respecting which our contemporary eccle- 

 siastical "gnostics" profess entire certainty. And in so far as 

 these ecclesiastical persons can be justified in the old-established 

 custom (which many nowadays think more honored in the 

 breach than the observance) of using opprobrious names to those 

 who differ from them, I fully admit their right to call me and 

 those who think with me " infidels " ; all I have ventured to urge 

 is that they must not expect us to speak of ourselves by that 

 title. 



The extent of the region of the uncertain, the number of the 

 problems the investigation of which ends in a verdict of not 



