PRIMARY CONCEPTS OF MODERN SCIENCE. 103 



thing) inertia ; and conversely, as I have already pointed out in my 

 first article, we know nothing of mass, except by its relation to force. 

 Mass, inertia (or, as it is sometimes, though inaccurately, called, mat- 

 ter per se), is indistinguishable from absolute nothingness ; for matter 

 reveals its presence, or evinces its reality, only by its action, its force, 

 its tension or motion. But, on the other hand, mere force is equally 

 nothing ; for, if we reduce the mass upon which a given force, however 

 small, acts until it vanishes — or, mathematically expressed, until it 

 becomes infinitely small — the consequence is that the velocity of the 

 resulting motion is infinitely great, and that the " thing " (if under 

 these circumstances a thing can still be spoken of) is at any given mo- 

 ment neither here nor there, but everywhere — that there is no real 

 presence. It is impossible, therefore, to construct matter by a mere 

 synthesis of forces. And it is incorrect to say, with Bain (" Logic," ii., 

 225), that " matter, force, and inertia, are three names for substan- 

 tially the same fact," or that " force and matter are not two things, 

 but one thing," or (ib., p. 389) that " force, inertia, momentum, mat- 

 ter, are all one fact " — the truth being that force and inertia are con- 

 ceptual constituents of matter, and neither is in any proper sense a fact. 

 Nor is the ordinary analysis of physical reality into matter + force cor- 

 rect, inasmuch as force is already implied in the term matter. It is 

 an analysis of a thing into two elements, one of which is the thing it- 

 self. The true formula of matter is mass x force, or inertia x force. 



We now have before us, in full view, one of the fundamental falla- 

 cies of the atomic theory. This fallacy consists in the delusion that 

 the conceptual constituents of matter can be grasped as separate and 

 real entities. The corpuscular atomists take the element of inertia 

 and treat it as real by itself, while Boscovich, Faraday, and all those 

 who define atoms as " centres of force," seek to realize the correspond- 

 ing element, force, as an entity by itself. In both cases elements of 

 reality are mistaken for kinds of reality. It is, therefore, sheer non- 

 sense to speak, with Papillon (see the article on the Constitution of 

 Matter in the September number of this journal, p. 553), of a " bare 

 energy, stripped of its material dress ;" of a " force in its purest essence, 

 upon which we look as on the marble of the antique, in splendid 

 nakedness, which is radiant beauty too." 1 



This disposes, in my judgment, of the authority of the " scientific 

 imagination," in all cases where an attempt is made to determine the 

 constitution of matter. In respect to the general question, however, 

 whether our ability to imagine a thing is decisive of its possible reality, 



1 The translation of the passage from which the above is taken, though on the whole 

 admirable, fails to do justice to the magniloquence of the original, which reads thus : 

 " Toutes ces energies n'apparaissent a nous a de rares exceptions pres que revetues de 

 cet uniforme qu'on appelle la matiere. Une seule de ces energies se montre depouillee 

 de ce vetemeut et nue. . . . Comment la definir autrement que la force en sa plus pure 

 essence, puisque nous la contemplons comme un marbre antique dans une superbe nudite 

 qui est aussi une beaute radieuse." 



