THE TRANSITION OF INSTITUTIONS. 133 



however, that, beyond the political bias under its party-form, there is a 

 more general political bias — the bias toward an exclusively-political 

 view of social affairs, and a corresponding faith in political instrumen- 

 talities. As affecting the study of Social Science, this bias was shown 

 to be detrimental as directing the attention too much to the phe- 

 nomena of social regulation, and excluding from thought the activities 

 regulated, constituting an aggregate of phenomena far more important. 



Lastly, we came to the theological bias, which, under its general 

 form and under its special forms, disturbs in various ways our judg- 

 ments on social questions. Obedience to a supposed divine command 

 being its standard of rectitude, it does not ask concerning any social 

 arrangement whether it conduces to social welfare, so much as whether 

 it conforms to the creed locally established. Hence, in each place and 

 time, those conceptions about public affairs which the theological bias 

 fosters, tend to diverge from the truth in so far as the creed then and 

 there accepted diverges from the truth. And besides the positive evil 

 thus produced, there is a negative evil, due to discouragement of the 

 habit of estimating actions by the results they eventually cause — a 

 habit which the study of Social Science demands. 



Having thus contemplated in general and in detail the difficulties 

 of the Social Science, we turned our attention to the preliminary dis- 

 cipline required. Of the conclusions reached so recently, the reader 

 scarcely needs reminding. Study of the sciences in general having 

 been pointed out as the proper means of generating fit habits of 

 thought, it was shown that the sciences especially to be attended to 

 are those treating of Life and of Mind. There can be no understand- 

 ing of social actions without some knowledge of human nature ; there 

 can be no deep knowledge of human nature without some knowledge 

 of the laws of Mind ; there can be no adequate knowledge of the laws 

 of Mind without knowledge of the laws of Life. And, that knowledge 

 of the laws of Life, as exhibited in Man, may be properly grasped, at- 

 tention must be given to the laws of Life in general. 



What is to be hoped from such a presentation of difficulties and 

 such a programme of preparatory studies ? Who, in drawing his con- 

 clusions about public policies, will be made to hesitate by remembering 

 the many obstacles that stand in the way of right judgments ? Who 

 will think it needful to fit himself by inquiries so various and so ex- 

 tensive ? Who, in short, will be led to doubt any of the inferences he 

 has drawn, or be induced to pause before he draws others, by con- 

 sciousness of these many liabilities to error arising from want of 

 knowledge, want of discipline, and want of duly-balanced sentiments ? 



To these questions there can be but the obvious reply — a reply 

 which the foregoing chapters themselves involve — that very little is to 

 be expected. The implication throughout the argument has been that 

 for every society, and for each stage in its evolution, there is an appro- 



