3 oo THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



" Here Mr. Spencer discusses the theory of the unconditioned, by which 

 word we are to understand God. The Scotch philosopher, Hamilton, and his 

 disciple, Mr. Mansel, say with our French positivists, ' We cannot affirm the 

 positive existence of any thing whatever, except phenomena.' Hamilton and 

 his disciple differ from our countrymen only in this, that tliey bring in a 'mi- 

 raculous intervention,' which enables us to believe in the existence of the un- 

 conditioned ; and in virtue of this truly miraculous intervention the* whole 

 system of orthodoxy is set up again. Is it true that we can affirm nothing be- 

 yond phenomena ? Mr. Spencer holds that in such an assertion there is grave 

 error. The logical side of a question, as he very justly observes, is not the only 

 one: there is also the psychological side; and, as we take it, he proves that the 

 positive existence of the Absolute is a necessary datum of consciousness. . . . 



" This is the basis of agreement between Keligion and Science. In a chapter 

 entitled 'Reconciliation,' Mr. Spencer establishes and develops this agreement 

 on its true ground. . . . Mr. Spencer, by standing on the ground of logic 

 and psychology, without recurring to supernatural intervention, has established 

 the legitimacy, the necessity, and the everlasting permanency of religion itself." 



I turn next to what has been said by Dr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, 

 in his essay on " The Future of Metaphysic," published in the Con- 

 temporary Review for November, 1872. Remarking only, with respect 

 to the agreements he expresses in certain doctrines of mine, that I 

 value them as coming from a thinker of subtlety and independence, I 

 will confine myself here to his disagreements. Dr. Hodgson, before 

 giving his own view, briefly describes and criticises the views of Hegel 

 and Comte, with both of whom he partly agrees and partly disagrees, 

 and then proceeds to criticise the view set forth by me. After a pre- 

 liminary brief statement of my position, to the wording of which I 

 demur, he goes on to say : 



" In his ' First Principles,' (Part L, second edition), there is a chapter headed 

 ' Ultimate Scientific Ideas,' in which he enumerates six such ideas or groups of 

 ideas, and attempts to show that they are entirely incomprehensible. The six 

 are: 1. Space and Time; 2. Matter; 3. Rest and Motion; 4. Force; 5. Con- 

 sciousness ; 6. The Soul, or the Ego. Now, to enter at length into all of these 

 would be an undertaking too large for the present occasion ; but I will take the 

 first of the six, and endeavor to show in its case the entire untenability of Mr. 

 Spencer's view ; and, siuce the same argument may be employed against the 

 rest, I shall be content that my case against them should be held to fail if my 

 case should fail in respect to Space and Time." 



I am quite content to join issue with Dr. Hodgson on these terms ; 

 and will proceed to examine, one by one, the several arguments which 

 he uses to show the invalidity of my conclusions. Following hig 

 criticism in the order he has chosen, I begin with the sentence follow- 

 ing that which I have just quoted. The first part of it runs thus: 

 "The metaphysical view of Space and Time is, that they are elements 

 in all phenomena, whether the phenomena are presentations or repre- 

 sentations." 



Whether, by " the metaphysical view," is here meant the view of 



