REPLIES TO CRITICISMS. 301 



Kant, whether it means Dr. Hodgson's own view, or whether the ex- 

 pression has a more general meaning, I have simply to reply that the 

 metaphysical view is incorrect. Dealing with the Kantian version of 

 this doctrine, that Space is a form of intuition, I have pointed out 

 that only with certain classes of phenomena is Space invariably 

 united; that Kant habitually considers phenomena belonging to the 

 visual and tactual groups, with which the consciousness of Space is 

 inseparably joined, and overlooks groups with which it is not insep- 

 arably joined. Though, in the adult, perception of sound has certain 

 space-implications, mostly, if not wholly, acquired by individual ex- 

 perience ; and though it would seem, from the instructive experiments 

 of Mr. Spalding, that, in creatures born with nervous systems much 

 more organized than our own are at birth, there is some innate per- 

 ception of the side from which a sound comes; yet it is demonstrable 

 that the space-implications of sound are not originally given with the 

 sensation as its form of intuition. Bearing in mind the Kantian 

 doctrine, that Space is the form of sensuous intuitions not only as pre- 

 sented but also as represented, let us examine critically our musical 

 ideas. As I have elsewhere suggested to the reader — 



" Let him observe what happens when some melody takes possession of his 

 imagination. Its tones and cadences go on repeating themselves apart from 

 any space-consciousness — they are not localized. He may or may not be 

 reminded of the place where he heard them ; this association is incidental only. 

 Having observed this, he will see that such space-implications as sounds have 

 are learned in the course of individual experience, and are not given with the 

 sounds themselves. Indeed, if we refer to the Kantian definition of form, we 

 get a simple and conclusive proof of this. Kant says form is ; that which effects 

 that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations.' 

 How then can the content of the phenomenon we call sound be arranged? Its 

 parts can be arranged in order of sequence — that is, in Time. But there is no 

 possibility of arranging its parts in order of coexistence — that is, in Space. 

 And it is just the same with odor. Whoever thinks that sound and odor 

 have Space for their form of intuition may convince himself to the contrary by 

 trying to find the right and left sides of a sound, or to imagine an odor turned 

 the other way upward." — {Principles of Psychology, § 399.) 



As I thus dissent, not I think without good reason, from " the 

 metaphysical view of Space and Time" as "elements in all phe- 

 nomena," it will naturally be expected that I dissent from the first 

 criticism which Dr. Hodgson proceeds to deduce from it. Dealing 

 first with the arguments I have used to show the incomprehensibility 

 of Space and Time, if we consider them as objective, and stating in 

 other words the conclusion I draw, that, " as Space and Time cannot 

 be either non-entities nor the attributes of entities, we have no choice 

 but to consider them as entities," Dr. Hodgson continues : 



u So far good. Secondly, he argues that they cannot be represented in 

 thought as such real existences, because, ' to be conceived at all, a thing must 



