3 o8 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



My second comment is, that the description of me as " quite at one 

 with Kant," " barring " the " theory of the prehistoric origin of these 

 intuitions," curiously implies that it is a matter of comparative in- 

 difference whether the forms of thought are held to be naturally gen- 

 erated^ intercourse between the organism and its environing relations, 

 during the evolution of the lowest into the highest types, or whether 

 such forms are held to be supernaturally given to the human mind, 

 and are independent both of environing relations and of ancestral 

 minds. But now, addressing myself to the essential point, I must 

 meet the statement that I have "misunderstood the exact meaning of 

 what Kant calls the intuitions of Space and Time," by saying that I 

 think Prof. Max Miiller has overlooked certain passages which justify 

 my interpretation, and render his interpretation untenable. For Kant 

 says " Space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the 

 external sense ; " further, he says that "Time is nothing but the form 

 of our internal intuition ; " and, to repeat words I have used elsewhere, 

 " He distinctly shuts out the supposition that there are forms of the 

 non-ego to which these forms of the ego correspond," by saying that 

 " Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward ex- 

 periences." Now, so far from being in harmony with, these state- 

 ments are in direct contradiction to, the view which I hold, and seem 

 to me absolutely irreconcilable with it. How can it be said that, 

 " barring " a difference represented as trivial, I am " quite at one with 

 Kant," when I contend that these subjective forms of intuition are 

 moulded into correspondence with, and therefore derived from, some 

 objective form or nexus, and therefore dependent upon it ; while the 

 Kantian hypothesis is that these subjective forms are not derived from 

 the object, but exist independently in the ego, and are imposed by it 

 on the non-ego ? It seems to me that not only do Kant's words, as 

 above given, exclude the view which I hold, but also that Kant could 

 not consistently have held any such view. Rightly recognizing, as he 

 did, these forms of intuition as innate, he was, from his stand-point, 

 obliged to regard them as imposed on the matter of intuition in the 

 act of perception. In the absence of the hypothesis that intelligence 

 has been evolved, it was not possible for him to regard these subjective 

 forms as having been derived from objective forms. 



A disciple of Locke might, I think, say that the Evolution-view of 

 our consciousness of Space and Time is essentially Lockian, with more 

 truth than Prof. Max Miiller can represent it as essentially Kantian. 

 The Evolution-view is completely experiential. It differs from the 

 original view of the experientialists by containing a great extension 

 of it. With the relatively-small effects of individual experiences, it 

 joins the relatively-vast effects of the experiences of antecedent indi- 

 viduals. But the view of Kant is avowedly and absolutely unexpe- 

 riential. Surely this makes the predominance of kinship manifest. 



In Prof. Max Muller's replies to my criticisms on Kant I cannot 



