REPLIES TO CRITICISMS. 411 



and that which is thought about, and did I propose to treat of the 

 order of things, not as phenomenally manifested but as noumenally 

 proceeding, the objection would be fatal. But, the aim being simply 

 to formulate the order of things as present under relative forms, the 

 antithetical Non-relative here named as implied by the conception of 

 the Relative is that which, in any act of thought, is independent of 

 and beyond it, rather than which is inclusive of it. Further, it should 

 be observed that this Non-relative, spoken of as a necessary comple- 

 ment to the Relative, is not spoken of as a conception but as a con- 

 sciousness ; and I have in sundry passages distinguished between 

 those modes of consciousness which, having limits, and constituting 

 thought proper, are subject to the laws of thought, and the mode of 

 consciousness which persists when the removal of limits is carried to 

 the uttermost, and when distinct thought consequently ceases. 



This opens the way to the reply here to be made to Mr. Martineau's 

 criticism, namely : that while by the necessities of thought the Rela- 

 tive implies a Non-relative; and while, to think of this antithesis 

 completely, requires that the Non-relative shall be made a conception 

 proper; yet, for the vague thought which is alone in this case possible, 

 it suffices that the Non-relative shall be present as a consciousness 

 which though undefined is positive. Let us observe what necessarily 

 happens when thought is employed on this ultimate question. 



In a preceding part of the article criticised, I have, in various 

 ways, aimed to show that, alike when we analyze the product of 

 thought and when we analyze the process of thought, we are brought 

 to the conclusion that invariably " a thought involves relation, differ- 

 ence^ likeness ;" and that, even from the very nature of Life itself, 

 we may evolve the conclusion that, " thinking being relationing, no 

 thought can ever express more than relations." What now must hap* 

 pen if thought, having this law, occupies itself with the final mystery ? 

 Always implying terms in relation, thought implies that both terms 

 shall be more or less defined ; and, as fast as one of them becomes in- 

 definite, the relation also becomes indefinite, and thought becomes in- 

 distinct. Take the case of magnitudes. I think of an inch ; I think 

 of a foot ; and, having tolerably definite ideas of the two, I have a 

 tolerably definite idea of tl^e relationship between them. I substitute 

 for the foot a mile; and, being able to represent a mile much less defi- 

 nitely, I cannot so definitely think of the relation between an inch and 

 a mile — cannot distinguish it in thought from the relation between an 

 inch and two miles, as clearly as I can distinguish in thought the rela- 

 tion between an inch and one foot from the relation between an inch 

 and two feet. And now if I endeavor to think of the relation between 

 an inch and the 240,000 miles from here to the moon, and the relation 

 between an inch and the 92,000,000 miles from here to the sun, I find 

 that while these distances, practically inconceivable, have become little 

 more than numbers to which I frame no answering ideas, so, too, have 



