REPLIES TO THE QUARTERLY REVIEWERS. 543 



his denial of the existence of any fundamental and essential distinc- 

 tion between Duty and Pleasure." Following this by a statement 

 respecting the genesis of moral sentiments as understood by me (which 

 is extremely unlike the one I have given in the " Principles of Psy- 

 chology" (§ 215, §§ 503-512, and §§ 524-532), the reviewer goes on 

 to say that " we yield with much reluctance to the necessity of affirm- 

 ing that Mr. Spencer gives no evidence of ever having acquired a 

 knowledge of the meaning of the term * morality,' according to the 

 true sense of the word."' 



Just noting that, as shown by the context, the assertion thus made 

 is made against all those who hold the Doctrine of Evolution in its 

 unqualified form, I reply that, in so far as it concerns me, it is one the 

 reviewer would scarcely have made had he more carefully examined 

 the evidence — not limiting himself to those works of mine named at 

 the head of his article. And I cannot but think that, had the spirit 

 of fairness, which he evidently strives to maintain, been fully awake 

 when these passages were written, he would have seen that, before 

 making so serious an allegation, wider inquiry was needful. If be 

 had simply said that, given the doctrine of mental evolution as held 

 by me, he failed to see how moral principles were to be established, I 

 should not have objected ; provided he had also said that I believe 

 they can be established, and had pointed out what I hold to be their 

 bases. As it is, however, he has so presented his own inference from 

 my premises as to make it seem an inference which I also must draw 

 from my premises. Quite a different and much more secure founda- 

 tion for moral principles is alleged by me than that afforded by moral 

 sentiments and conceptions, which he refers to as though they formed 

 the sole basis of the ethical conclusions I hold. While the reviewer 

 contends that " Mr. Spencer's moral system is even yet more pro- 

 foundly defective, as it denies any objective distinction between right 

 and wrong in any being, whether men are or are not responsible for 

 their actions," I contend, contrariwise, that it is distinguished from 

 other moral systems by asserting the objectivity of the distinction, 

 and by endeavoring to show that the subjective distinction is derived 

 from the objective distinction. In my first work, " Social Statics," 

 published twenty-three years ago, the essential thesis is that, apart 

 from their warrant as alleged Divine injunctions, and apart from their 

 authority as moral intuitions, the principles of justice are primarily 

 deducible from the laws of life, as carried on under social conditions. 

 I argued throughout that these principles so derived have a supreme 

 authority, to which considerations of immediate expediency must 

 yield, and I was for this reason classed by Mr. Mill as an anti-utili- 

 tarian. More recently, in a letter drawn from me by this misappre- 

 hension of Mr. Mill, and afterward published by Prof. Bain in his 

 " Mental and Moral Science," I have restated this position. Already, 

 in an explanatory article entitled " Morals and Moral Sentiments," 



