544 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



published in this Review for April, 1871, I have quoted passages from 

 that letter ; and here, considering the gravity of the assertions made 

 by the Quarterly reviewer, I hope to be excused for requoting them : 



" Morality, properly so called — the science of right conduct — has for its ob- 

 ject to determine how and why certain modes of conduct are detrimental, and 

 certain other modes beneficial. These good and bad results cannot be acci- 

 dental, but must be necessary consequences of the constitution of things; and 1 

 conceive it to be the business of Moral Science to deduce, from the laws of life 

 and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to pro- 

 duce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its 

 deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct, and are to be conformed to 

 irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery." 



" If it is true that pure rectitude prescribes a system of things far too good 

 for men as they are, it is not less true that mere expediency does not of itself 

 tend to establish a system of things any better than that which exists. While 

 absolute morality owes to expediency the checks which prevent it from rush- 

 ing into Utopian absurdities, expediency is indebted to absolute morality for all 

 stimulus to improvement. Granted that we are chiefly interested in ascertain- 

 ing what is relatively right, it still follows that we must first consider what is 

 absolutely right ; since the one conception presupposes the other." 



And the comment I then made on these passages I may make now, 

 that " I do not see how there could well be a more emphatic assertion 

 that there exists a primary basis of morals independent of, and in a 

 sense antecedent to, that which is furnished by experiences of utility, 

 and consequently independent of, and in a sense antecedent to, those 

 moral sentiments which I conceive to be generated by such expe- 

 riences." I will only add that, had my beliefs been directly opposite 

 to those I have enunciated, the reviewer might, I think, have found 

 good reasons for his assertion. If, instead of demurring to the doc- 

 trine that " greatest happiness should be the immediate aim of man," 1 

 I had indorsed that doctrine — if, instead of explaining and justifying 

 " a belief in the special sacredness of these highest principles", and a 

 sense of the supreme authority of the altruistic sentiments answering 

 to them," 2 I had denied the sacredness and the supreme authority — 

 if, instead of saying of the wise man that " the highest truth he sees 

 he will fearlessly utter, knowing that, let what may come of it, he is 

 thus playing his right part in the world," 3 I had said that the wise 

 man will not do this — the reviewer might with some truth have de- 

 scribed me as not understanding " the term ' morality ' according to 

 the true sense of the word." And he might then have inferred that 

 the Doctrine of Evolution, as I hold it, implies denial of the " distinc- 

 tion between Duty and Pleasure." But, as it is, I think the evidence 

 will not generally be held to warrant his assertion. 



I quite agree with the reviewer that the prevalence of a philosophy 



1 " Social Statics," chapter iii. 2 " Principles of Psychology," § 531. 



3 " First Principles," § 34. 



