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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



yield agreement or results that have com- 

 pelled the general acceptance of thinkers. 

 Its problems were too complex, subtile, and 

 exalted, to be effectually dealt with before 

 men had been trained to the work of inves- 

 tigation on the subordinate planes of natu- 

 ral phenomena. The lower before the high- 

 er, the simple before the complex, must be 

 the law of movement where not only truths 

 of the highest order are to be reached, but 

 the methods by which they are to be ar- 

 rived at have also to be discovered. There 

 was needed a long and severe apprentice- 

 ship of science in the work of unraveling 

 phenomena before the realm of mind could 

 be entered with any confidence of its con- 

 quest. And it was not only necessary to 

 learn by scientific practice the difficult art 

 of investigation, but the solution of mental 

 problems was vitally dependent upon a spe- 

 cies of knowledge which ordinary science 

 alone could disclose. Of mind, as a phe- 

 nomenon to be investigated, we know noth- 

 ing whatever, except as a manifestation of 

 organic life. It is conditioned by organic 

 laws, and there can be no competent men- 

 tal science that does not recognize this 

 truth. Mind, moreover, is exhibited, with 

 a thousand modifications, through all the 

 grades of animate being, and these diversi- 

 ties must be regarded by any true science 

 of the subject. The psychical natures of 

 the quadruped, the bird, the fish, the insect, 

 may not be so dignified as that of man, and 

 may afford less inspiring themes for decla- 

 mation, but, in a scientific point of view, 

 they are of equal interest, and their inves- 

 tigation is imperative. It could not be other- 

 wise, therefore, than that mental philosophy 

 should be profoundly affected both by that 

 drill in research and that extension of 

 knowledge which have resulted from the 

 last three centuries of scientific progress. 

 The new phase which the subject has con- 

 sequently assumed is known as the Modern 

 Psychology or the New Psychology, and 

 this has given rise to a school of thought, 

 the most eminent representatives of which 

 are Englishmen. With a few exceptions, 

 and those of hardly the highest mark, Ger- 

 many clings to the old methods. France is 

 behind the age in every thing, our own coun- 

 try is crippling along after European tradi- 

 tions, and it is left to England to pioneer 



the world in the work of psychological de- 

 velopment. 



Prof. Ribot's book is the tribute of a 

 candid and unprejudiced foreigner to the 

 greatness of the English school of scientific 

 psychology, and it is an admirable analysis 

 of the contributions of the representative 

 English writers upon this subject. An en- 

 thusiastic student of philosophy himself, 

 and thoroughly imbued with the scientific 

 spirit, Prof. Ribot brings eminent qualifica- 

 tions to his task, and grasps the subject 

 with the power of a master, while his work 

 has a judicial fairness in the estimate of 

 men that is favored by his foreign point of 

 view. He writes, moreover, with a point 

 and clearness that are quite unusual in 

 treating this class of subjects. Prof. Ribot 

 gives us in this volume a lucid account of 

 the systems of Hartley, James Mill, Herbert 

 Spencer, Alexander Bain, George H. Lewes, 

 Samuel Bailey, and John Stuart Mill, and 

 his work altogether affords the best deline- 

 ation we have of the positions and grounds 

 of the New Psychological School that has 

 come forward into such prominence in the 

 present generation. 



Prof. Ribot prefixes to his volume an 

 admirable and instructive introductory 

 chapter on the relations of philosophy, 

 science, and metaphysics, and the gradual 

 growth and present position of scientific 

 psychology. In his section considering the 

 several definitions of it, he remarks as fol- 

 lows concerning one of them : 



"We are told that psychology is the 

 science of the human soul. That is a very 

 narrow and incomplete idea of it. Is bi- 

 ology ever defined as the science of human 

 life ? Has physiology ever believed, even 

 in its infancy, that its only object was man ? 

 Have they not considered, on the contrary, 

 that every thing which has organized and 

 manifested life belongs to them — the infu- 

 soria, as well as man ? Now, unless we ad- 

 mit the Cartesian opinion of animal ma- 

 chines — which has no longer, to my knowl- 

 edge, an adherent — we must acknowledge 

 that animals have their sensations, their 

 sentiments, their desires, their pleasures, 

 their pains, their character, just like our- 

 selves ; that there is a collection of psycho- 

 logical facts which one has no right to sub- 

 tract from the science. Who has studied 



