REALITY AND TRUTH 373 



verting experience, a raw material, into beautiful and marketable truth. 

 Since then the members of this society have closely scrutinized the new- 

 comers, and many have been black-balled. The society is anything but 

 infallible. Not unf requently it has let in members which afterward had 

 to be ejected with violence, greatly to the discomfort of all concerned. 

 Still more often, I suspect, it has refused to admit worthy candidates 

 who would have been a credit to it. Thus it has come about that many 

 so-called truths are not true at all, for the alleged process of verification 

 was faulty ; while supposed untruths may be destined in the fullness of 

 time to be recognized as true. 



At this point we must consider the pragmatic doctrine of truth, as 

 ■expounded by James and others. Pragmatism says, try all things and 

 hold fast to that which is good. Ask always, how does this work ? Will 

 it make a good member of the truth-makers' society? It is a doctrine 

 of intellectual dynamics, of activity, of judgment based on knowledge. 

 To this extent it is therefore a wind fanning the flame of intellectual 

 activity, to the end of burning up the dross and extracting the gold. 

 It is the scientific method invading the field of philosophy. 



It has, however, a double aim. In testing an alleged truth by its 

 consequences, it merely follows the scientific method of determining 

 whether it will, as it should, articulate properly with pre-ascertained 

 truth. It recognizes that for us, things are true which have endured the 

 test. This, however, is only the beginning of its quest. It goes fur- 

 ther, and asks what things, of those which may be called true, are worth 

 while from a human standpoint. It is inclined to hold, indeed, that 

 this very serviceability is in itself a test of truth. It is for this reason 

 that Professor Schinz calls it " opportunism in philosophy." 



The word philosophy, originally signifying the love of wisdom, has 

 •come to have many diverse meanings. Quite commonly it is taken to 

 signify a theory of the totality of existence, as, for example, in Haeckel's 

 monistic philosophy. Since it appears that much of reality is meta- 

 psychic, a theory embracing the whole of it must be beyond the powers 

 of the human mind, and, as is certainly the case with monism, we find 

 ourselves in possession of nothing more than a point of view. It is, 

 indeed, with the point of view that philosophy must concern itself, and 

 he is a philosopher who has scrutinized and recognized as a whole the 

 landscape visible from his peculiar point of vantage, without necessarily 

 formulating any opinions concerning what is to him unknown. I would 

 therefore say that one's philosophy is one's attitude toward experience- 

 able reality, and inasmuch as every one must have some such attitude, 

 all are to this extent philosophers. One's philosophy, as thus defined, 

 may be consistent or inconsistent, limited or comprehensive, optimistic 

 or pessimistic, active or sluggish, in almost infinite variety. It is obvi- 

 ous that its character determines to a tremendous extent one's person- 



