WHAT PRAGMATISM IS 577 



of " Humanism " is excellent and ought to be adopted. The narrower prag- 

 matism may still be spoken of as the " pragmatic method." 



Before proceeding further or attempting to set forth what the 



movement has seemed to mean to others who have written upon the 



subject, whether favorably or otherwise, it may be advisable for us 



to pause and ask ourselves if we are certain that we understand what 



its brilliant protagonist means. Is the language in which he has 



couched it so vague, obscure, ambiguous, uncertain or contradictory as 



to warrant the different constructions that have been placed thereon? 



I ask this question advisedly, since Professor James himself, in his 



Pragmatism, has said: 



On all hands we find the " pragmatic movement " spoken of, sometimes with 

 respect, sometimes with contumely, seldom with clear understanding. 



It would seem that it ought to be well worth our while to try to get 

 at the reason for this. 



It may be that in so doing we can derive some assistance from the 

 rules applied by the courts in the interpretation and construction of 

 constitutions, statutes, contracts, deeds, wills and other written in- 

 struments. Some of these rules are so well settled that they are 

 regarded as almost axiomatic and pass unquestioned. They are even 

 applied to the construction of charges and instructions given by trial 

 judges to juries to aid them in reaching correct verdicts in the trial 

 of contested cases, whether human life, liberty or property is involved. 

 If it be practicable and safe to apply them in the settlement of such 

 vital questions, surely they may be used profitably and safely, even 

 pragmatically, if you will, in abstract discussions along philosophical 

 or religious lines. Of course, there are some points of difference in 

 the application of these rules by the courts to the different kinds or 

 classes of instruments, but such points are of minor importance and 

 may be treated as negligible for our present purposes. In setting 

 forth some of these cardinal rules, I shall divest them of all legal 

 technicalities, as far as may be, and clothe them in plain, simple 

 language. 



1. When the language of a writing is plain and unequivocal, there 

 is neither occasion nor opportunity for interpretation. When the 

 words used admit of but one meaning, to put another upon them is 

 not to construe or interpret a writing, but to alter it. 



2. Words are presumed to be used in their plain, ordinary sense; 

 technical terms are to be understood in their technical sense ; all words 

 are to be understood according to their meaning at the time and place 

 of writing them. 



3. The grammatical and ordinary sense of words is to be adhered 

 to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or 

 inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the gram- 



