34 DARWINISM AND EVOLUTION. 



instincts may be formed out of purely reflex actions by natural 

 selection ; and instinctive processes pass into rational processes 

 when they become too complex to be performed unhesitatingly. 

 In the pause that occurs there is time for remembered experiences 

 to operate as motives, furthering or hindering the proper reflex of 

 a stimulated sense ; and the resultant action is known to us as 

 " volition." An animal capable of deliberate instead of thought- 

 less, instinctive, or unconsidered action is better adapted than 

 others to a changing environment. Rational processes, however, 

 when they are often repeated, become habits ; and habits may 

 become fixed by heredity as secondary instincts. 



But the subject of intelligence may be regarded from another 

 point of view. Mind-stuff, says Clifford, is the reality which we 

 perceive as matter. A moving molecule of inorganic matter does 

 not possess mind or consciousness ; but it possesses a small piece 

 of mind-stuff. When molecules are so combined together as to 

 form the film on the under side of a jelly-fish, the elements of 

 mind-stuff which go along with them are so combined as to form 

 the faint beginnings of sentience. When the molecules are so 

 combined as to form the brain and nervous system of a vertebrate 

 the corresponding elements of mind-stuff are so combined as to 

 form some kind of consciousness. When matter takes the 

 complex form of a living human brain, the corresponding mind- 

 stuff takes the form of a human consciousness, having intelligence 

 and volition. 



There is a well known rotifer whose microscopic body is 

 provided with a very active tail, which is armed at its extremity 

 with strong pincers. " I have seen," says Mr. Romanes, " a small 

 " specimen of this rotifer seize a much larger one with its pincers. 

 " The large rotifer at once became very active, and swinging 

 " about with its burden until it came to a piece of weed, it took . 

 " firm hold of the weed with its own pincers, and began the most 

 " extraordinary series of movements, which were obviously directed 

 " towards ridding itself of the encumbrance. It dashed from side 

 " to side in all directions with a vigour and suddenness which 

 " were highly astonishing, so that it seemed as if the animalcule 

 " would either break its pincers or wrench its tail from its body. 

 " No movement could possibly have been better suited to jerk off 

 " the offending object. But not less surprising was the tenacity 

 " with which the smaller rotifer retained its hold. This trial of 

 " strength, which must have involved an immense expenditure of 

 " energy in proportion to the size of the animals, lasted for several 

 "minutes, till eventually the smaller rotifer was thrown violently 

 "away. The entire scene was as like intelligent action on the 

 " part of both creatures as could well be imagined." 



Some animals, like the bee, profit by experience very quickly. 

 Others, higher in the so-called scale of life, very slowly. Prof. 



