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things. Their implications are no more mateiialistic than they ar« 

 spiritualistic ; and no more spiritualistic than they are materialistic. 

 Any argument which is apparently furnished to either hypothesis, ia 

 neutralized by as good an argument furnished to the other. The 

 Materialist, seeing it to be a necessary deduction from the law of correla- 

 tion, that what exists in consciousness under the form of feeling, is 

 transformable into an equivalent of mechanical motion, and by 

 consequence into equivalents of all the other forces which matter 

 exhibits ; may consider it therefore demonstrated that the phenomena of 

 consciousness are material phenomena. But the Spiritualist, setting out 

 with the same data, may argue with equal cogency, that if the forces 

 displayed by matter are cognizable only under the shape of those 

 equivalent amounts of consciousness which they produce, it is to be 

 inferred that these forces, when existing out of consciousness, are of the 

 same intrinsic nature as when existing in consciousness ; and that so is 

 justified the spiritualistic conception of the external world, as consisting of 

 something essentially identical with what we call mind. Manifestly, the 

 establishment of correlation and equivalence between the forces of the outer 

 and the inner worlds, may be used to assimilate either to the other ; ac- 

 cording as we set out with one or other term. But he who rightly inter- 

 prets the doctrine contained in this work, will see that neither of these 

 terms can be taken as ultimate. He will see that though the relation of 

 subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of 

 Spirit and Matter ; the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but 

 a sign of the Unknown Reality which underlies both." 



This is the conception which your reviewer continues to speak 

 of as " mechanical " and " mechanist ;" without giving his readers 

 any suspicion of the qualified sense in which only these words can 

 be applied. If he thinks that by doing this he has represented the 

 conception with fairness, or with any approach to fairness, I cannot 

 agree with him. 



I am. Sir, 



Yours, &c., 



HEEBBRT SPENCER. 

 London, December 5, 1868. 



d^/^X 



