Proceedings of the British Association, 103 



adaptation of means to their end, which is its fundamental principle in 

 all its applications (the means being here the total devotion of our moral 

 and intellectual powers — the end, our own happiness and that of all 

 around us) — if such be the far hopes and long protracted aspirations of 

 science, its philosophy and its logic assume a paramount importance, 

 in proportion to the practical danger of erroneous conceptions in the 

 one, and fallacious tests of the validity of reasoning in the other. 



On both these subjects works of first-rate importance have of late 

 illustrated the scientific literature of this country. On the philo- 

 sophy of science, we have witnessed the production, by the pen of a 

 most distinguished member of this University, of a work so com- 

 prehensive in its views, so vivid in its illustrations, and so right- 

 minded in its leading directions, that it seems to me impossible for 

 any man of science, be his particular department of inquiry what it may, 

 to rise from its perusal without feeling himself strengthened and in- 

 vigorated for his own especial pursuit, and placed in a more favour- 

 able position for discovery in it than before, as well as more compe- 

 tent to estimate the true philosophical value and import of any new 

 views which may open to him in its prosecution. From the peculiar 

 and a priori point of view in which the distinguished author of the 

 work in question has thought proper to place himself before his sub- 

 ject, many may dissent ; and I own myself to be of the number ; — 

 but from this point of view it is perfectly possible to depart without 

 losing sight of the massive reality of that subject itself: on the con- 

 trary, that reality will be all the better seen and understood, and its 

 magnitude felt, when viewed from opposite sides, and under the in- 

 fluence of every accident of light and shadow which peculiar habits 

 of thought may throw over it. 



Accordingly, in the other work to which I have made allusion, 

 and which, under the title of a ' System of Logic,' has for its object 

 to give " a connected view of the principles of evidence and the 

 methods of scientific investigation" — its acute, and in many respects 

 profound author — taking up an almost diametrically opposite station, 

 and looking to experience as the ultimate foundation of all knowledge 

 — at least, of all scientific knowledge — in its simplest axioms as well 

 as in its most remote results — has presented us with a view of the 

 inductive philosophy, very different indeed in its general aspect — 



