THE RUSSIAN SITUATION 



373 



market. At first this outlet for their 

 trade was a luxury to their economic de- 

 velopment, but as, to a greater and 

 greater extent, their trade became com- 

 mitted to this vast territory it became 

 more and more of an economic necessity 

 that they retain and increase their grip 

 on Russia. 



The northern or Baltic provinces of 

 Russia are very largely populated by 

 persons of German blood who have for 

 many generations been Russian subjects. 

 It is natural that these people, in a meas- 

 ure, should feel and understand German 

 aspirations and aid and abet in their plans 

 where possible. 



By this I do not mean to assert that 

 all Baltic Russians are pro-German, for 

 some of the ablest and most loyal men 

 and devoted troops have come from this 

 part of Russia; but it is true that many 

 of the worst influences have also been of 

 Baltic province extraction. For ten years 

 before the war we can trace the German 

 influence moving through every specious 

 channel of intrigue and malevolent ac- 

 tivity to gain ascendency in the internal 

 policies of the Russian Government. 



GERMANS OPPOSE A LIBERAL RUSSIA 



There is little reason to doubt that the 

 German influence has aimed in every way 

 to check the growth of liberalism in Rus- 

 sia. There are many who believe that 

 but for the German influence there would 

 have come the abolition of vodka five 

 years before the war. The elimination 

 of this curse would have meant educa- 

 tion, and with education inevitably must 

 have come a demand for a more liberal 

 government and a ministry responsible 

 to the Duma. 



Alone the Germans could not have 

 hoped to exert this influence ; but we 

 find in Russia another group, commonly 

 known as the bureaucracy, who had a 

 community of interests with the Teutons. 

 The bureaucracy represents the office- 

 holders and officials appointed by the 

 Throne, who have for generations, and 

 one might almost say for centuries, 

 preyed upon the resources of the Rus- 

 sian Empire, which, unchecked, have 

 flown irresponsively through a small 



group of public buildings in the Russian 

 capital. 



There has been during and before the 

 war a cooperation between these two 

 parties, the enduring prestige of which 

 depended on German victory and Rus- 

 sian defeat. It is clear that if Germany 

 had been overwhelmingly defeated, both 

 the pro-Germans and the bureaucrats 

 would have lost the hold they had on the 

 Russian Empire. 



Russia's unpreparedness 



It is probably true that none of these 

 dark forces had any great apprehension 

 at the beginning of the war that Ger- 

 many could lose ; for, being well aware of 

 Russia's unpreparedness, it seemed in- 

 credible that she could triumph over her 

 enemy — efficient, complete, and ready for 

 the war. 



Russia owes to the Grand Duke Nich- 

 olas Nicholaievitch the salvation of the 

 Russian cause, for during the first six 

 months, with the absolute power dele- 

 gated to him by the Tsar, he completely 

 upset the original military program of 

 the Russian General Staff in Petrograd 

 and of the Minister of War, Sukomlinov, 

 afterward removed for corruption and 

 alleged treachery. 



The original Russian program seems 

 to have contemplated an early defensive. 

 By a suspicious coincidence the German 

 plan of campaign had anticipated the sup- 

 posed negative campaign of the Russians 

 and little effort had, therefore, been made 

 for the defense of East Prussia, the 

 greater part of German energy being di- 

 rected toward the invasion of France. 



The Grand Duke, loyal to the cause of 

 the Allies and faithful to the interests of 

 Russia, in quick response to the appeals 

 from France, upset, almost over night, 

 the original defensive program and 

 launched his East Prussian campaign. 



The Germans were probably taken by 

 complete surprise as perhaps was the 

 Russian Minister of War in Petrograd. 

 The result of the Grand Duke's offensive 

 in August, 1914, was to fill the Unter den 

 Linden in Berlin with refugees fleeing 

 panic stricken from East Prussia. It was- 

 impossible for the Kaiser to advertise,, 

 convincingly, successes in the west when* 



