THE FOOD ARMIES OF LIBERTY 



191 



that the condition of shipping requires 

 tnat all the foodstuffs sent sUali be of the 

 most concentrated sort. Therefore, the 

 commodities which we have to send are 

 most advantageously limited to wheat, 

 corn, beef, pork products, dairy products, 

 and sugar. 



If we consider our own supplies, we 

 find that we have enough of corn. We 

 have a great surplus of potatoes, vege- 

 tables, fish, and poultry. These latter 

 commodities do not lend themselves to 

 shipment either from bulk or other 

 reasons. We cannot increase, or even 

 maintain, our present exports of wheat, 

 beef, pork, dairy products, and sugar 

 without reducing our consumption. 



we; must eat the kind oe eood that 

 cannot be exported 



The logical and sensible first step in 

 adapting our supplies to Allied needs is 

 to substitute on our own tables corn, po- 

 tatoes, vegetables, fish, and poultry for 

 those staples we wish to export. The 

 proportion of our national diet in vege- 

 tables is very low, and it will not only do 

 no harm to increase it, but in fact will 

 contribute to public health. 



Space does not permit that I should 

 give you the position here of each staple 

 in the national and international situa- 

 tion. I may, however, describe briefly 

 one or two of them. 



We of the United States normally raise 

 for export about 80,000,000 bushels of 

 wheat. Canada produces something like 

 100,000,000 bushels of wheat for export. 

 Europe must import this year 525,000,- 

 000 bushels of wheat if they are to main- 

 tain their normal bread supply. (See 

 page 189.) With our normal export of 

 80,000,000 bushels, we can go but a short 

 distance toward accomplishing that end. 

 If, however, by conservation we increase 

 our export to 200,000,000 bushels and 

 Canada increased hers to 125,000,000 we 

 shall then come within 200,000,000 bush- 

 els of the solution of the problem. 



By conservation and by substituting 20 

 to 25 per cent of other cereals in Eu- 

 rope's war bread and by some imports 

 from far-distant markets, the # problem 

 may be solved, but the margin is so nar- 

 row that any failure on our part to pro- 



vide an extra 120,000,000 bushels of 

 wheat risks disaster to the whole cause. 

 For us to increase exports of wheat 

 from 80,000,000 bushels to 200,000,000 

 bushels means that we must make a sav- 

 ing of about 20 per cent in our wheat 

 consumption. That is not a great bur- 

 den for our people to bear. 



EUROPEANS HAVE NOT EEARNED TO EAT 

 CORN 



This means an average saving of one 

 pound of flour per person per week out 

 of their five pounds' consumption, and it 

 is not asking much of our people that 

 they should substitute other cereals to 

 that extent. 



Now a number of inquiries arise with 

 reference to different phases of this ques- 

 tion, and one is why Europe does not 

 take the corn instead of the wheat ? 



For one hundred years the wheat loaf 

 has been the basis of life in Europe, with 

 the exception of Italy. The art of house- 

 hold baking has long since been lost. 

 Most of the bread is baked by bakers. 

 For this reason alone it is almost impos- 

 sible for our Allies to substitute corn 

 bread, which cannot be distributed by 

 bakers. Furthermore, the actual house- 

 hold machinery of baking — ovens, etc. — ■ 

 has long since been out of existence in 

 most European homes. 



Furthermore, if we are to ship corn, 

 we must ship it in the form of the grain 

 itself, for cornmeal does not keep well, 

 and European countries have but little 

 facilities for milling the corn. They are 

 mixing cornmeal in the wheat flour ; but 

 there is a limit beyond which cereals can- 

 not be mixed in the wheat loaf and have 

 the bread rise, and that limit is some- 

 where about 25 or 30 per cent. They are 

 using higher milled wheat than we for 

 economy's sake, and mixing it with other 

 cereals. It makes war bread far less 

 palatable than our corn bread. 



WE USE FOUR TIMES AS MUCH SUGAR AS 

 OUR ALLIES 



Another case in point is sugar. We 

 import between one-half and two-thirds 

 of our sugar from the West Indies. The 

 Allies formerly drew sugar from Russia, 

 Germany, Austria, and Java. They are 

 now compelled to bring their demands to 



