﻿48 
  HUNTING 
  LICENSES. 
  

  

  was 
  a 
  fundamental 
  civil 
  right, 
  which, 
  according 
  to 
  any 
  just 
  theory 
  of 
  government, 
  

   was 
  entitled 
  to 
  the 
  protection 
  of 
  the 
  law; 
  that, 
  therefore, 
  while 
  the 
  right 
  might 
  of 
  

   course 
  be 
  regulated 
  by 
  state 
  legislation, 
  this 
  amendment 
  required 
  that 
  the 
  laws 
  for 
  

   such 
  purpose 
  should 
  operate 
  equally 
  upon 
  all 
  persons 
  within 
  the 
  jurisdiction; 
  and 
  

   that 
  the 
  statute, 
  securing 
  such 
  a 
  right 
  to 
  some 
  persons, 
  and 
  denying 
  it 
  to 
  others 
  in 
  

   substantially 
  similar 
  situation, 
  was 
  invalid. 
  But 
  the 
  court 
  decided 
  that 
  laws 
  of 
  

   this 
  nature 
  were 
  not 
  within 
  the 
  purview 
  of 
  this 
  clause 
  of 
  the 
  amendment; 
  that 
  it 
  

   had 
  been 
  framed 
  to 
  remedy 
  the 
  evils 
  arising 
  from 
  the 
  existence 
  of 
  laws 
  in 
  the 
  states 
  

   where 
  the 
  newly-emancipated 
  negroes 
  resided, 
  which 
  discriminated 
  with 
  gross 
  injus- 
  

   tice 
  and 
  hardship 
  against 
  them 
  as 
  a 
  class; 
  and 
  that 
  this 
  design 
  must 
  be 
  kept 
  in 
  view 
  

   in 
  determining 
  the 
  scope 
  and 
  effect 
  of 
  the 
  provision; 
  the 
  learned 
  justice 
  who 
  spoke 
  

   for 
  the 
  court 
  saying: 
  ' 
  We 
  doubt 
  very 
  much 
  whether 
  any 
  action 
  of 
  a 
  state 
  not 
  

   directed 
  by 
  way 
  of 
  discrimination 
  against 
  the 
  negroes 
  as 
  a 
  class, 
  or 
  on 
  account 
  of 
  

   their 
  race, 
  will 
  even 
  be 
  held 
  to 
  come 
  within 
  the 
  purview 
  of 
  this 
  provision. 
  It 
  is 
  so 
  

   clearly 
  a 
  provision 
  for 
  that 
  race 
  and 
  that 
  emergency, 
  that 
  a 
  strong 
  case 
  would 
  be 
  

   necessary 
  for 
  its 
  application 
  to 
  any 
  other. 
  ' 
  *" 
  * 
  * 
  

  

  Bearing 
  in 
  mind, 
  then, 
  this 
  indication 
  of 
  the 
  scope 
  of 
  the 
  amendment, 
  afforded 
  by 
  

   the 
  ultimate 
  arbiter 
  of 
  its 
  construction, 
  how 
  can 
  it 
  be 
  said 
  that 
  the 
  statute 
  now 
  under 
  

   review 
  is 
  interdicted 
  by 
  it? 
  * 
  * 
  * 
  The 
  statute 
  seems 
  to 
  stand 
  in 
  the 
  same 
  cate- 
  

   gory 
  as 
  the 
  Louisiana 
  act, 
  as 
  an 
  exercise 
  of 
  the 
  police 
  power 
  for 
  the 
  regulation 
  of 
  

   one 
  of 
  the 
  modes 
  of 
  acquiring 
  property; 
  and, 
  as 
  such, 
  it 
  might 
  be 
  embraced 
  within 
  

   the 
  terms 
  of 
  the 
  amendment, 
  by 
  giving 
  them 
  their 
  widest 
  signification, 
  but, 
  restricted 
  

   as 
  the 
  supreme 
  court 
  declares 
  their 
  meaning 
  to 
  be, 
  they 
  do 
  not 
  touch 
  the 
  matter 
  in 
  

   hand. 
  No 
  rights 
  of 
  the 
  prosecutor 
  under 
  the 
  federal 
  constitution 
  therefore 
  seem 
  to 
  

   be 
  infringed. 
  

  

  Iii 
  the 
  Illinois 
  case, 
  In 
  re 
  Eberle 
  (98 
  Fed. 
  295), 
  the 
  validity 
  'of 
  the 
  

   nonresident 
  license 
  was 
  directly 
  decided. 
  Frank 
  Eberle, 
  a 
  citizen 
  of 
  

   Iowa 
  and 
  a 
  member 
  of 
  the 
  Crystal 
  Lake 
  Club, 
  an 
  Illinois 
  corporation 
  

   authorized 
  to 
  acquire 
  and 
  own 
  real 
  estate 
  in 
  Illinois 
  for 
  use 
  as 
  a 
  game 
  

   and 
  fish 
  preserve, 
  was 
  arrested 
  when 
  hunting 
  on 
  the 
  lands 
  of 
  the 
  club. 
  

   He 
  was 
  charged 
  with 
  hunting 
  without 
  a 
  license 
  in 
  violation 
  of 
  the 
  State 
  

   law 
  requiring 
  a 
  license 
  of 
  $10 
  from 
  nonresidents, 
  passed 
  in 
  1899 
  subse- 
  

   quent 
  to 
  the 
  incorporation 
  of 
  the 
  club. 
  At 
  the 
  trial 
  the 
  defendant 
  

   was 
  adjudged 
  guilty 
  of 
  violation 
  of 
  the 
  statute 
  and 
  was 
  sentenced 
  to 
  

   pay 
  a 
  fine 
  of 
  $25 
  and 
  costs 
  and 
  stand 
  committed 
  until 
  the 
  fine 
  was 
  

   paid. 
  An 
  unsuccessful 
  application 
  was 
  made 
  to 
  the 
  United 
  States 
  

   circuit 
  court 
  for 
  a 
  writ 
  of 
  habeas 
  corpus. 
  

  

  In 
  denying 
  the 
  writ 
  the 
  court 
  held: 
  

  

  The 
  sovereign 
  ownership 
  of 
  wild 
  game 
  is 
  in 
  the 
  state, 
  in 
  trust 
  for 
  the 
  benefit 
  of 
  

   its 
  citizens; 
  and 
  a 
  statute 
  requiring 
  the 
  payment 
  of 
  a 
  license 
  by 
  a 
  nonresident 
  for 
  the 
  

   privilege 
  of 
  hunting 
  such 
  game 
  within 
  the 
  state 
  is 
  a 
  police 
  regulation 
  within 
  the 
  

   power 
  of 
  the 
  state, 
  and 
  not 
  in 
  violation 
  of 
  article 
  4, 
  sec. 
  2, 
  of 
  the 
  federal 
  consti- 
  

   tution, 
  or 
  of 
  section 
  1 
  of 
  the 
  fourteenth 
  amendment, 
  although 
  such 
  fee 
  is 
  not 
  required 
  

   of 
  residents 
  of 
  the 
  state; 
  nor 
  is 
  the 
  validity 
  of 
  such 
  regulations 
  as 
  to 
  a 
  particular 
  

   individual, 
  who 
  is 
  a 
  nonresident 
  of 
  the 
  state, 
  affected 
  by 
  the 
  fact 
  that 
  he 
  is 
  a 
  stock- 
  

   holder 
  in 
  a 
  corporation 
  of 
  the 
  state 
  which 
  owns 
  lands 
  maintained 
  as 
  a 
  game 
  preserve. 
  

  

  Several 
  important 
  decisions 
  are 
  on 
  record 
  sustaining 
  statutes 
  pro- 
  

   hibiting 
  nonresidents 
  from 
  taking 
  oysters. 
  As 
  early 
  as 
  1823 
  the 
  

   United 
  States 
  circuit 
  court 
  upheld 
  the 
  New 
  Jersey 
  oyster 
  law 
  of 
  1820 
  

  

  