CONSCIOUSNESS. 253 



We often act without being conscious of it ; and that often arises 

 from habit, and often, in a^ premeditated action, from the mind having 

 lost its consciousness of the premeditation. 



In another case the effect of the action shall not be exactly what 

 was premeditated. For instance, I intend taking something into 

 another room or to some person ; and, instead of the thing intended, 

 I take something else very different, a something probably I should 

 not by any means have taken. This is what is called ' absence of 

 mind.' 



Consciousness may arise in consequence of sensation, but not from 

 demonstrative sensation ; for consciousness has always a relation to 

 ourselves. All animals may be said to have consciousness, but cannot 

 be sensible of it. 



Sensation and demonstration are absolute and the same, and stand 

 the first in order of evidence ; they are that to which everybody 

 gives assent. Perhaps conviction is the next or second [in order, or 

 degree of certitude], and belief the third ; but these three have a rela- 

 tion to other bodies. Conviction is an impression on the mind which is 

 equal in that mind to sensation or demonstration ; therefore it is not 

 necessary first to produce sensation or demonstration. To produce 

 actions will be according to the circumstances that become the cause of 

 conviction, whereby our causes of actions, and our actions, are increased 

 beyond what they otherwise would be. 



A conviction of the truth of any proposition is the same as feeling 

 the force of any argument or proposition ; it is a perfect belief. 



Belief is another impression of the mind, which is another substitute 

 for sensation or demonstration, and which becomes also a cause of 

 actions ; but the impression is weaker than conviction, and is that which 

 the mind or the reasoning faculty does not insist upon, as it does in 

 conviction. It arises from a conveyance to the mind of a something 

 that is supposed to exist but not demonstrated, only possible or pro- 

 bable ; it arises from reasoning, and it is more than probable it is pecu- 

 liar to the human species. 



The first, or sensation or ' demonstration,' is absolute ; but the second 

 or ' conviction,' and the third or ' belief,' may or may not be so. Con- 

 viction requires the greatest evidence next to demonstration ; and con- 

 viction is a greater degree of belief. 



Consciousness generally relates to ourselves : it is not similar to a 

 conviction of, or a belief in, other things. 



It is of two kinds : one an acquired feeling, as "I am conscious to 

 myself that I deserve it;" or, what is weaker, "I believe I shall get 

 it." To be conscious one has done a wrong thing, would appear to 



