254 PSYCHOLOGY. 



belong to some brutes : a dog when he has done a wrong thing shows 

 signs of it. 



The other [kind of consciousness] is a natural or instinctive feeling 

 or impression ; for consciousness is .not only a relation between me and 

 some other thing as above stated, but has the same relation to the body. 

 I am conscious of my own strength : I am conscious of my own weak- 

 ness : we can even carry this so far as to say we feel our own strength 

 or weakness. All animals have the same consciousness relative to 

 themselves, which becomes one of the instinctive principles. A horse 

 will not take a leap that he is not capable of performing : he is con- 

 scious he either can or cannot perform it. 



How far these two [kinds of consciousness] are the same when they 

 do take place I will not at present say : I cannot separate the impres- 

 sions themselves if they are sensible, although I can the causes ; but 

 their effects are so much alike that they would appear to be one prin- 

 ciple. They produce the same degree of confidence and the same degree 

 of timidity. Confidence in the power assists the will : the sense of a 

 want of power becomes a proper check upon the will. 



This self-consciousness not only regulates many of our natura^ 

 actions when in health, but the actions of the machine while under 

 disease, both in the whole and in a part. We have an internal monitor 

 of our powers, and we use them accordingly. This is often so strong 

 that many know they are dying, — a thing they cannot know from expe- 

 rience. 



This principle is even remarkable in parts that are diseased. I do 

 not mean the active parts themselves, as muscles ; for in such the dis- 

 ease might render them incapable of action, and of course no action 

 coidd take place ; but this consciousness of inability in other parts to 

 support these actions, is a fact which can arise from no other principle 

 than the effect or intelligence given to the mind of the inability of the 

 part to support the action. 



For instance, if the tendon of a muscle be broken, the breaking that 

 tendon does not alter in the least the nature of that muscle, as a muscle ; 

 but, while that tendon is incapable of supporting the action of the 

 muscle, that muscle will not act, and the mind is conscious of it ; and, 

 as long as the mind is in possession of this feeling, the will has no 

 command over such muscle : but, as consciousness can only exist when 

 we are awake, the mind, which is awake, while we are asleep, can and 

 does put such a muscle into action 1 . The same thing happens when 



1 [We should now say that, because the mind is asleep, any stimulus exciting to 

 involuntary or reflex action, operates by the wakeful ' sensitive principle,' unchecked, 

 upon the disabled muscle.] 



