268 PSYCHOLOGY. 



Having committed acts of violence always weakens the mind ; there- 

 fore [it is the] more ready to fly to innovation, or to whatever seems 

 most severe [by way of expiation]. 



On Deceit. 



Perhaps there is nothing in Nature more pleasing than the study of 

 the human mind, even in its imperfections or depravities : for, although 

 it may be more pleasing to a good mind to contemplate and investigate 

 the applications of its powers to good purposes, yet as depravity is an 

 operation of the same mind, it becomes at least equally philosophical 

 and equally necessary to investigate, that we may be able to prevent it. 



The investigation of the mind's various operations at large, by which 

 means it feels, thinks, reasons and influences the body either in volun- 

 tary or involuntary actions, is more than is requisite for my present 

 purpose. The mind, like everything else, can be employed in promoting 

 either good or evil actions, but it can as readily be employed in actions 

 that seem immediately to tend to neither good nor harm arising from 

 some strange or trifling impulse at the time. 



When we consider the mind of man as possessing a thousand quali- 

 ties which are distinct attributes in themselves, each being more or less 

 contrasted by its opposites, as, for instance, intrepidity, fear ; love, 

 hatred ; generosity, covetousness ; pleasure, pain ; anger, satisfaction ; 

 complacency, envy ; humility, pride ; vanity, diffidence ; probity, deceit 

 — all producing distinct characters, when acting alone, or when the one 

 or the other is predominant, — we must be sensible how complicated the 

 mind is ; but as they [the qualities or attributes] are often mixed in the 

 same person, they produce contrarieties in character which form the 

 basis of all the oddities or inconsistencies we meet with. 



One of the imperfections of the human mind is, the desire to be sup- 

 posed what we are not, but what we should like to be. This arises from 

 vanity, which, when well regulated, is perhaps a very necessary and 

 useful principle. But we often wish to appear to be what we in reality 

 hate, and are probably afraid of being, which would seem to be a strange 

 contradiction in the principle of deceit. If the first deceit was always for 

 noble purposes one would excuse the vanity ; but it is generally for 

 little selfish purposes, and might be called the ' childishness of man- 

 hood.' We are even jealous of those who may, with justice, be supposed 

 to possess those qualities, in a degree beyond what we wished the world 

 to think we ourselves possessed them. 



]Sb man is so fond of being thought brave as the coward, who would 

 be really delighted if he was thought always to have an affair of 

 honour on his hands : while the truly courageous man would rather 



