272 PSYCHOLOGY. 



any two of them whereby we can terminate the one and begin the 

 other. Therefore we shall consider these periods when in their full 

 maturity ; and, as we proceed, shall consider the gradual changes into 

 the next ; as where the first is gaining, then losing, while the second is 

 gaining, (fee. But as these gradual changes are not so much, or so 

 directly, to our present purpose, they will only be mentioned as circum- 

 stances taking place, that may, in some degree, throw a light upon 

 our subject. 



The first period of a man's life is [passed in] the enjoyment of its 

 natural appetites and sensations, and [in] extending the actions natu- 

 rally arising out of the union of the body and mind. The mind is con- 

 stantly receiving impressions by its senses, and constantly forming new 

 ideas, laying up a store of sensations and ideas ; but, at first, without 

 form or method. 



New appetites are arising as the parts are becoming more fit for their 

 peculiar sensations and enjoyments, which are always more vigorous in 

 their early stages. So that a young animal is extremely active with 

 regard to bodily action ; being fitted for sensations and constantly in 

 pursuit of them ; yet it is extremely passive with regard to the combi- 

 nations of the mind : it is just a being receiving impressions, thinking 

 but little of the past; because the present enjoyment, and the future 

 wbich is nigh, are the highest sensations of the body and the mind. 

 These natural appetites are never improved ; they are most perfect at 

 the first, and will always be the most vigorous when the mind is least 

 engaged, or when there is no mind at all. The natural or necessary 

 appetites are limited : they are such as always destroy themselves by 

 enjoyment, but are renewed again by the body recurring to its natural 

 state. 



This is the age that in some degree bespeaks the future with respect 

 to intellect : it is the age that in most cases distinguishes the young 

 man of feeling, sensibility, quickness of apprehension, from the idiot. 

 The [state of the] idiot is one where impression produces sensation, not 

 upon the mind, but upon the botfy ; where the mind never makes an 

 application of the present sensation to another ; and where, when the 

 present sensation is gone, it never recurs. 



When the appetites for any one thing are vigorous, they carry us 

 great lengths ; but they are not lasting ; for some new object of appetite 

 appears, and destroys that for the former [object]. An appetite has 

 but one fixed point in view : it is simple enjoyment. If it be the 

 appetite of eating, it is intent only on eating ; and if it fixes the mind 

 on one kind of food, that desire cannot last long, for other food will 

 exactly answer the same purpose. Or, if that [kind of food] is not 



