276 PSYCHOLOGY. 



On Appetite and Passion. 



"Would not the following be a proper distinction between appetite 

 and passion ? 



Appetite is an action of the mind, arising from a stimulus given to it 

 from some part of the body ; and the appetite is this or that according 

 to the part that so excites the mind ; and, as appetite depends on a 

 state peculiar to such a part, or natural to such a part to fall into, 

 therefore it is always capable of being satiated. The part under such 

 irritation puts both mind and body into such actions as will best satisfy 

 or satiate the appetite. 



Passion is an action of the mind not arising from any mere irritation 

 of a part of the body, or from a stimulus given to it from parts within 

 ourselves, but from causes and relations which are from without. No 

 sensations of the body are to be gratified, but merely the sensation of 

 the mind. However, that sensation of the mind always tends to some 

 action of the body, and is to be gratified by certain actions which 

 naturally arise out of the passion. Passion is confined to no one object ; 

 almost every object can excite passion ; and while that passion lasts, 

 the object that first produced it still continues to be the object. 



Passions are instinct : they never improve. They are a union of 

 two principles, — a certain internal impulse, producing actions which 

 have concern in, or are connected with, a sensitive body, or which 

 produce effects that are ruled or guided by our sensations. If they 

 would seem to improve, it is only by encouraging them as we would 

 encourage an appetite of any kind : but their improvement is only in a 

 greater frequency, or repetition, especially in those the indulgence of 

 which does not impair the animal powers. 



Nature has not only given natural appetites, or internal impressions 

 for such and such actions, to animals, and an uneasiness while under 

 the impression, which peculiarity of uneasiness is the appetite itself, 

 but has added a pleasure in the actions of removing the uneasiness, or 

 gratifying the appetite ; for example, in eating, in the propagation of 

 the species, &c. But animals feel uneasiness when the bladder or 

 rectum is full, and have no peculiar pleasure in getting rid of the 

 uneasiness, further than arises from the cessation of uneasiness. 



On Instinct. 



Whatever impulse of action we have which does not arise from the 

 knowledge of the event, or from a motive, is ' instinct ;' and whatever 

 action arises from an intention, is ' reason.' 



The instinctive principle is probably nearly the same in all animals 



