THE SPEECH OF MONKEYS. 1 33 



new conditions and committed to his own re- 

 sources, we are then better able to judge by his 

 conduct whether he is actuated by reason or not. 



In any simple act where a monkey can see the 

 cause connected with and closely followed by 

 the effect, he is actuated by reason ; and while he 

 may not be able to explain to his own mind a 

 remote or complex cause, but simply accepts the 

 fact, it does not make the act any less rational in 

 a monkey than the same act would be in man 

 where he fails to grasp the ultimate cause. The 

 difference is that man is able to trace the connect- 

 ing causes and effects through a longer series 

 than a monkey can. Man can assign a more 

 definite reason for his acts than a monkey can ; 

 but it is also true that one man can assign a 

 more definite reason for his acts than another 

 man can for his, when prompted by the same 

 motives to the same act. 



The processes, motives, acts, and results are 

 the same with man and ape ; the degree to which 

 they reason differs, but the kind of reason in both 

 cases is the same. 



I shall here relate some instances in my expe- 

 rience, and leave the reader to judge whether 

 reason or instinct guided the acts of the monkeys 



