APPENDIX. 67 



later times, have treated the fubject with the greateft fuccefs, **£** 

 are they who have followed moft clofely the footfteps of the 

 Greek and the Roman philofophers. The theoretical queftion, 

 too, concerning the eflence of virtue, or the proper objecl of mo- 

 ral approbation, was a favourite topic of difcuflion in the an- 

 cient fchools. The queftion concerning the principle of moral 

 approbation, though not entirely of modern origin, has been 

 chiefly agitated fince the writings of Dr Cudworth, in oppo- 

 sition to thofe of Mr Hobbes ; and it is this queftion accord- 

 ingly, (recommended, at once, by its novelty and difficulty to 

 the curiofity of fpeculative men), that has produced moft of 

 the theories which charaderife and diftinguifh from each other 

 the later fyftems of moral philofophy. 



It was the opinion of Dr Cudworth and alfo of Dr Clarke, 

 that moral diftinciions are perceived by that power of the mind 

 which diftinguifhes truth from falfehood. This fyftem it was 

 one great object of Dr Hutcheson's philofophy to refute, and 

 in oppofltion to it, to fhew, that the words Right and Wrong 

 exprefs certain agreeable and difagreeable qualities in actions, 

 which it is not the province of reafon but of feeling to per- 

 ceive ; and to that power of perception which renders us fuf- 

 ceptible of pleafure or of pain from the view of virtue or of 

 vice, he gave the name of the Moral Senfe. His reafonings 

 upon this fubject are in the main acquiefced in, both by Mr 

 Hume and Mr Smith ; but they differ from him in one im- 

 portant particular, — Dr Hutcheson plainly fuppofing, that the 

 moral fenle is a fimple principle of our conftitution, of which 

 no account can be given ; whereas the other two philofophers 

 have both attempted to analyfe it into other principles more ge- 

 neral. Their fyftems, however, with refpecl to it are very 

 different from each other. According to Mr Hume, all the 

 qualities which are denominated virtuous, are ufeful either to 

 ourfelves or to others, and the pleafure which we derive from 

 the view of them is the pleafure of utility. Mr Smith, with- 



(I 2) out 



